358 NEW ESSAYS 



thing to what he has given us, which is always easier 

 than making an independent beginning 5 . For I think 

 I have removed some difficulties which he left entirely 

 alone. Thus his reputation is helpful to me ; and besides, 

 being disposed to do justice and very far from wishing 

 to lessen the esteem in which his work is held, I would 

 increase his reputation, if my approval have any weight 6 . 

 It is true that I often differ from him in opinion ; but, 

 far from 7 denying the worth of famous writers, we bear 

 witness to it by making known in what respect and for 

 what reasons we differ from their opinion, when we 

 think it necessary to prevent their authority from pre- 

 vailing against reason on some important points 8 ; and 

 besides, in replying to such excellent men, we make 

 it easier for the truth to be accepted, and it is to be 

 supposed that it is principally for truth that they are 

 working. 



In fact, although the author of the Essay says a thousand 

 fine things of which I cordially approve, our systems 

 greatly differ. His has more relation to Aristotle and 

 mine to Plato 9 , although in many things both of us have 



5 E. omits 'always' and adds (after 'beginning'), 'and working 

 on entirely untrodden ground.' 



6 E. omits from ' For I think ' to ' any weight.' 



7 E. reads 'denying on that account the worth of this famous 

 writer, I do him justice,' &c. 



8 E. omits the remainder of the sentence, from this point. 



9 The main principles of Leibniz's philosophy are really much 

 more akin to the philosophy of Aristotle than to the doctrines 

 which are peculiar to Plato. But, as regards Aristotle, Leibniz 

 is here thinking of that side of his philosophy which led the 

 Scholastics to attribute to him the saying, NihU est in intelledu quod 

 non prius fuerit in sensu. (Cf. Duns Scotus, Super Universalibus Porphyrii, 

 Question 3 : Itta propositio Aristotelis, nihil est in intelledu quin prius 



fuerit in sensu. . . .) This phrase does not occur in any of Aristotle's 

 writings ; but it serves as a fair enough analysis of several passages 

 in the Posterior Analytics, in which firi(TTrjfj.T) is traced to aiaOijais, 

 though other passages supplement this by bringing in the work of 

 vovs. (See especially Anal. Post. ii. 19, and Eth. vi. 3, 3.) The 

 view that the soul is a tabula rasa is suggested by the passage : 



