NEW ESSAYS 367 



marble, rather than a block of perfectly uniform marble 

 or than empty tablets, that is to say, what is called by 

 philosophers tabula rasa. For if the soul were like these 

 empty tablets, truths would be in us as the figure of 

 Hercules is in a block of marble, when the block of marble 

 is indifferently capable of receiving this figure or any 

 other. But if there were in the stone veins, which 

 should mark out the figure of Hercules rather than other 

 figures, the stone would be more determined towards 

 this figure, and Hercules would somehow be, as it were, 

 innate in it, although labour would be needed to uncover 

 the veins and to clear them by polishing and thus 

 removing what prevents them from being fully seen.,; 

 It is thus that ideas and truths are innate in us, as 

 natural inclinations, dispositions, habits or powers [vir- 

 tualites] 42 , and not as activities [actions'], although these 

 powers [virtualites] are always accompanied by some 

 activities [actions], often imperceptible, which correspond 

 to them. 



Our able author seems to maintain that there is in us 

 nothing virtual, and even nothing of which we are not 

 always actually conscious 43 . But this cannot be understood 

 in a strict sense ; otherwise his opinion would be too para- 

 doxical, since, for instance 44 , we are not always conscious 



42 Of. Monadology, 40, 43 and 54, with the notes. By a virtualite 

 Leibniz means something between a mere potency or capacity 

 and a fully-developed activity or actual idea. Thus necessary and 

 eternal truths are not innate in the soul in a fully-developed form, 

 nor, on the other hand, does the soul merely have a capacity for 

 receiving or acquiring them, but they are innate in germ, as im- 

 perfectly perceived ideas with a tendency to become perfectly 

 perceived. See Introduction, Part iii. pp. 125 sqq. and 130. 



43 Cf. Locke's Essay, bk. i. ch. i, 5. This position is an imme- 

 diate result of Cartesian principles. See Introduction, Part iii. 

 p. 126. Cf. Geulincx, Metaphysica Vera, Part i. (Opera, Land's ed., 

 vol. ii. p. 150) : ' It is impossible that he who does not know how 

 a thing is done should do it. If you do not know how a thing is 

 done you do not do it.' 



** E. reads 'since, although we are not, &c. . . . we often 

 bring, &c.' 



