NEW ESSAYS 373 



surrounding bodies make upon us, who contain infinity 68 , 

 this connexion which each being has with all the rest 

 of the universe. It may even be said that in conse- 

 quence of these petites perceptions the present is big with c9 

 the future and laden with the past, that there is a conspi- 

 ration of all things (cn^Trvota 7rai/ra, as Hippocrates said 70 ), 

 and that in the least of substances eyes as penetrating 

 as those of God might, read the whole succession of the 

 things of the universe, 



Quae sint, quae fuerint, quae mox futura trahantur 71 . 



These unconscious [insensible] perceptions also indicate 

 and constitute the identity of the individual, who is 

 characterized by the traces or expressions 72 of his pre- 

 vious states which these unconscious perceptions preserve, 

 as they connect his previous states with his present state ; 

 and these unconscious perceptions 73 may be known by 



is not necessary in the case of more distinct notions, which can be 

 made known to people by description, although we do not have 

 them at hand. . . . For this reason we are wont to say that the 

 notions of sense-qualities are clear, for they enable us to recognize the 

 qualities ; but that these notions are not distinct, because we cannot 

 discriminate nor unfold what they contain Within them. What 

 they contain is an I know not what, of which we are conscious but of 

 which we can give no account/ (Passages combined from G. vi. 

 492, 493, 5oo.) 



es E. reads ' and which contain infinity.' 



69 E, reads < full of.' 



70 See Monadology, note 97. 



71 ' What things are, what things have been, and what future 

 things may soon be brought forth.' Virgil, Georgics, iv. 393. Virgil 

 ascribes this knowledge to Proteus. Leibniz misquotes futura for 

 ventura : futura would not scan. 



72 E. omits l or expressions.' 



73 Leibniz merely says 'and they,' so that the reference is 

 doubtful. He may mean 'the traces of previous states.' What 

 is meant is simply that as the unconscious perceptions are the 

 development of previous states of perception and at the same time 

 contain, in a germinal or confused way, all future states of percep- 

 tion, they give continuity to the individual possessing them, i. e. 

 they constitute his identity. Contrast Locke's view, Essay, bk. ii. 

 ch. 27. Cf. Monadolog^J, note 114. 



