386 NEW ESSAYS 



susceptible of all divisions and even subjected actually to 

 divisions and subdivisions ad infinitum 2 ; but neverthe- 

 less with this difference that it is divisible and divided 

 unequally in different places, because of the motions, 

 more or less tending to division, which are already in 

 the particular place. Consequently matter has every- 

 where some degree of rigidity as well as of fluidity, and 

 there is no body which is hard or fluid in the highest 

 degree, that is to say, there is no atom of invincible 

 hardness, and no quantity of matter [masse] completely 

 indifferent to division 123 . Thus the order of nature and 

 especially the law of continuity make both 124 equally 

 inadmissible. 



I have also shown that cohesion, if not itself the effect 

 of impulse or motion, would cause a traction, strictly 

 speaking 125 . For if there were a fundamentally hard 



122 Cf. Monaddogy, 65. 



123 Two extremes are both impossible : (i) the absolutely hard or 

 solid, (2) the absolutely soft or fluid. An absolutely hard piece of 

 matter would be one in which the force holding it together should 

 be so strong that no combination of other forces could overcome it. 

 An absolutely soft portion of matter would be one in which there is 

 no force of cohesion whatever, nothing to resist division, so that it 

 would be 'completely indifferent to division.' Hardness or solidity 

 is, according to the law of continuity, simply a low degree of 

 softness or fluidity. 



m i.e. both a perfect atom and a perfect fluid. Cf. Third 

 Explanation of the New System, p. 335 with note. Also Nouveaux Essais. 

 bk. ii. ch. 4, 4 : 'I am also of opinion that all bodies have some 

 degree of cohesion, as in the same way I hold that there are none 

 which have not some fluidity and of which the cohesion cannot be 

 overcome : and consequently in my opinion the atoms of Epicurus, 

 the hardness of which is supposed to be invincible, cannot exist 

 any more than the perfectly fluid minute [subtile'] matter of the 

 Cartesians.' (E. 229 b; G. v. 114.) 



135 But, according to Leibniz, traction or attraction is unintelligible, 

 unless in the sense of a force or impulse which can be overcome by 

 counteracting forces. A * traction, strictly speaking.' would imply 

 that one part of matter is for ever bound (' thirled ') to another and 

 must therefore always be dragged along with it. Leibniz, however, 

 does admit that there is an apparent traction, even though there be 

 no visible contact between the parts which draw one another, as 



