NEW ESSAYS 393 



the complex idea of a spirit. And thus by putting 

 together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and 

 power of moving themselves 144 , we have as clear a per- 

 ception and notion of immaterial substances as well as 

 material 145 .' He also quotes other passages to show that 

 our author opposed spirit [esprit] to body, and says 

 (p. 54) 146 that the ends of religion and morality are best 

 secured by proving that the soul is immortal by its 

 nature, that is to say that it is immaterial. He also 

 quotes (p. 7o) 147 this passage that 'all the ideas we have 

 of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but 

 several combinations of simple ideas,' and that thus our 

 author thought that the idea of thinking and of willing 

 presupposes another substance, different from that which 

 is presupposed by solidity and impulse, and that thus 

 ( i7) 148 he indicates that these ideas constitute body as 

 opposed to spirit [esprit]. 



The Bishop of Worcester might have added that from 

 the fact that the general idea of substance is in body and 

 in spirit, it does not follow that their differences are 



and power of beginning motion, &c., co-existing in some substance, 

 we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit.' 



144 Leibniz reads ' our body' instead of ' themselves.' 



145 Leibniz reads ' as of material.' Stillingfleet here again 

 shortens Locke's statement, though he gives a more exact quotation 

 of it on p. 540. Locke wrote : ' And thus by putting together the 

 ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving them- 

 selves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion 

 of immaterial substances as we have of material. For putting 

 together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving 

 or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have 

 no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit ; and by 

 putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of 

 being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no 

 positive idea, we have the idea of matter.' 



146 Stillingneet's Works, vol. iii. p. 535 : ' I am of opinion that 

 the great ends of religion and morality are best secured by the 

 proofs of the immortality of the soul from its nature and properties, 

 and which I think prove it immaterial.' 



147 Stillingfleet, iii. 539 ; Locke's Essay, ii. 23, 6. 



148 Essay, ii. 23, 17 ; Stillingfleet, iii. 540. 



