

OF THK 



I UNIVERSITY 

 NEW ESSAYS \397 



be given to matter, not as matter, but as enriched by a 

 Divine power. Finally he quotes (p. 434) l66 the observa- 

 tion of a traveller so considerable 167 and judicious as 

 M. de la Loubere 16S that the Pagans of the east recognize 

 the immortality of the soul without being able to com- 

 prehend its immateriality. 



Regarding all this I will observe, before coming to 

 the statement of my own view, that it is certain that 

 matter is as little capable of producing feeling [sentiment] 

 mechanically, as it is of producing reason 169 , as our 

 author admits ; and that I most certainly recognize that 

 it is not allowable to deny what one does not understand, 

 but I add that we have a right to deny (at least in the 

 order of nature) that which is absolutely neither intel- 

 ligible nor explicable. I maintain also that substances^ 

 (material or immaterial) cannot be conceived in their] 

 bare essence without any activity, that activity is of the 

 essence of substance in general ; and that the conceptions^ 

 of created beings are not the measure of the power of 



lee Works, iv. 485 ; Bohn's ed., ii. 406. 



167 Locke's word. 



168 Simon de la Loubere, born at Toulouse in 1642, died in 1729. 

 In 1687 Louis XIV entrusted him with a mission to Siam for the 

 purpose of establishing diplomatic and commercial relations between 

 that country and France. As the result of a three months' resi- 

 dence in Siam he published two volumes DuRoyaume deSiam (1691 ; 

 Eng. trans. 1693), in which he gives an elaborate account of the 

 Siamese people, their history, customs, and institutions. The book 

 still ranks as an authority on its subject. Locke's quotation is 

 taken from vol. i. ch. 19, 4. 



169 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. iv. ch. 3, 6 (E. 346 b ; Q-. v. 360) : 

 1 The primary powers constitute the substances themselves ; and the 

 derivative powers, or if you like, the faculties, are merely modes [faqons 

 d'etre], which must be derived from substances, and they are not 

 derived from matter in so far as it is merely mechanical, that is to 

 say, in so far as by abstraction we take account only of the incomplete 

 being of materia prima, or that which is entirely passive. And in 

 this I think you will agree with me, sir, that it is not in the power 

 of a mere mechanism to produce perception, sensation, reason.' 

 Cf. Locke, Essay, bk. iv. ch. 10, TO (Eraser, vol. ii. p. 313) ; also 

 Monadology, 17. 



