406 PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE 



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these, which is the shortest, is divided, not into paragraphs, 

 but into two chapters, the point of division being the end of 

 paragraph 6, where transition is made from 'Physics' to 

 ' Metaphysics.' In the other two MSS. the paragraph division 

 appears, and the text from which the translation is made is 

 that of the last and most complete manuscript. In the 

 Principles of Nature and of Grace the arrangement of the 

 matter is much less clear and careful than it is in the Monad- 

 ology. But, following the lines of the division originally made 

 by Leibniz himself, we may say that paragraphs 1-6 inclusive 

 give an account of the created Monads in themselves and in 

 their relations to one another, so far as these can be considered 

 apart from God ; while the remaining paragraphs consider the 

 nature of God as ultimate reason of the universe, and the 

 consequences which follow from His perfection in power, 

 wisdom and goodness. Some of the most important points in 

 the Monadology are either passed over or very slightly treated 

 in the Principles of Nature and of Grace. For instance, in 

 the Principles of Nature and of Grace there is nothing to 

 correspond to the passage in the Monadology regarding the two 

 great principles of knowledge, and while the pre-established 

 harmony is mentioned, it is not dwelt upon. But the connexion 

 between the two writings, both in treatment and expression, is 

 so close that the annotations to the Principles of Nature and of 

 Grace may be comparatively brief. 



The Principles of Nature and of Grace will be found in E. 

 714 sqq. ; G. vi. 598 sqq. 



i. Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple 

 or compound. Simple substance is that which has no 

 parts. Compound substance 1 is the combination of simple 

 substances or Monads. Monas is a Greek word, which 

 means unity, or that which is one. Compounds or bodies 

 are pluralities [multitudes] ; and simple substances, lives, 

 souls, spirits, are unities. And everywhere there must 

 be simple substances, for without simple substances there 



1 See Monadology, note 2. Strictly speaking 'compound sub- 

 stance,' according to Leibniz, is not ' substance ' at all. It is not 

 substantia but substantiatum. Failure to observe this distinction was 

 to some extent the source of Wolff's misinterpretation of Leibniz. 



