138 Unconscious Memory 



for we have seen brain and handled it ; but until we have 

 seen a mind and handled it, or at any rate been enabled 

 to draw inferences which will warrant us in conceiving of 

 it as a material substance apart from bodily substance, 

 we cannot infer that it has an organisation apart from 

 bodily organisation. Does Von Hartmann mean that we 

 have two bodies — a body-body, and a soul-body ? 



He says that no one will call the action of the spider 

 instinctive in voiding the fluids from its glands when they 

 are too full. Why not ? 



He is continually personifying instinct ; thus he speaks 

 of the " ends proposed to itself by the instinct," of " the 

 blind unconscious purpose of the instinct," of " an 

 unconscious purpose constraining the volition of the 

 bird," of " each variation and modification of the in- 

 stinct," as though instinct, purpose, and, later on, clair- 

 voyance, were persons, and not words characterising a 

 certain class of actions. The ends are proposed to itself 

 by the animal, not by the instinct. Nothing but mischief 

 can come of a mode of expression which does not keep 

 this clearly in view. 



It must not be supposed that the same cuckoo is in the 

 habit of laying in the nests of several different species, 

 and of changing the colour of her eggs according to that 

 of the eggs of the bird in whose nest she lays. I have 

 inquired from Mr. R. Bowdler Sharpe of the ornitho- 

 logical department at the British Museum, who kindly 

 gives it me as his opinion that though cuckoos do imitate 

 the eggs of the species on whom they foist their young 

 ones, yet one cuckoo will probably lay in the nests of one 

 species also, and will stick to that species for life. If so, 

 the same race of cuckoos may impose upon the same 



