14-2 Unconscious Memory 



and the modifications of that action which more nearly 

 resemble results of reason, to be actions of the same 

 ultimate kind differing in degree only, and if we thus 

 attempt to reduce instinctive action to the prophetic 

 strain arising from old experience, we shall be obhged to 

 admit that the formation of the embryo is ultimately due 

 to reflection — which he seems to think is a reductio ad 

 ahsurdum of the argument. 



Therefore, he concludes, if there is to be only one source, 

 the source must be unconscious, and not conscious. We 

 repl3^ that we do not see the absurdity of the position 

 which we grant we have been driven to. We hold that 

 the formation of the embryo is ultimately due to reflec- 

 tion and design. 



The writer of an article in the Times, April i, 1880, says 

 that servants must be taught their calling before they 

 can practise it ; but, in fact, they can only be taught their 

 calling by practising it. So Von Hartmann says animals 

 must feel the pleasure consequent on gratification of an 

 instinct before they can be stimulated to act upon the 

 instinct by a knowledge of the pleasure that will ensue. 

 This sounds logical, but in practice a little performance 

 and a little teaching — a little sense of pleasure and a little 

 connection of that pleasure \vith this or that practice, — 

 come up simultaneously from something that we cannot 

 see, the two being so small and so much abreast, that we 

 do not know which is first, performance or teaching ; and, 

 again, action, or pleasure supposed as coming from the 

 action. 



" Geistes-mechanismus " comes as near to " disposition 

 of mind," or, more shortly, " disposition," as so unsatis- 

 factory a word can come to an5'thing. Yet, if we trans- 

 late it throughout by " disposition," we shall see how 

 little we are being told. 



