242 TJie UniUj of the Organism 



trated in this example. Conscious will and choice seemingly 

 do not come into the operation at all. Given the right con- 

 ditions, internal and external, the caterpillar goes through 

 the concatenation of operations necessary for its existence, 

 willy-nilly. Moreover, the actions initiated by the warm 

 weather, the larvae being yet down at the base of the shrubs 

 or branches, have in organic prospect, as one might say, a 

 supply of food peculiar to the species. And this supply, 

 be it remarked, is several inches at least, and several min- 

 utes at least, away from the larva at the beginning of its 

 round of activities. Its future, even more obviously than 

 its present, existence is involved in the acts. Anticipatori- 

 ness is perhaps the most conspicuous attribute of the adap- 

 tiveness of such activities. C. Lloyd Morgan has well ex- 

 pressed the truth that one of the most important lessons 

 to be learned from the study of animal behavior "in its or- 

 ganic aspect" is the fact that "living cells may react to 

 stimuli in a manner which we perceive to be subservient to a 

 biological end, and yet react without conscious purpose — 

 that is, automatically." ^ 



But from our examination of the cell-theory we conclude 

 that "living cells" in this statement ought to read "living 

 organisms." 



So much by way of further preparation, in the reflex and 

 tropistic phases of animal life, for our search after a vital 

 connection between the physical and the psychical. It will 

 now be advantageous to return to that supremely important 

 aspect of human psychic life already examined somewhat, 

 namely that of Wundtian apperception. 



A Still Closer Look at the Likeness Between Higher Ra- 

 tional Life and Tropisms 



As Royce's statement of the objections to the concep- 

 tion of Wundt contains several points that will be useful to 



