SletcJi of an Organismol Thcori/ of Consciousiuss 1^291 



comprehensible tlian are otliers. 



Chemically viewed tlie problem now on our hands is en- 

 tirely one of fact — fact as determined by observation alone, 

 and by observation with the aid of experimentation. If it 

 can be shown that each individual conscious beinr^ really does 

 behave like a chemical substance in the process of reacting; 

 and if the result of such reaction can be shown to have even 

 one of the essential marks of a chemical product, both propo- 

 sitions of my two-parted hypothesis are warrantable and the 

 hypothesis becomes genuinely scientific — a genuine "working 

 hypothesis" — one, that is, for bio-chemistry to take seri- 

 ously. 



More Systematic Justification of the Hypotliesis 



That the propositions are demonstrable to the extent of 

 the demand just indicated is my contention. Tliis conten- 

 tion I will now try to make good and will begin with a few 

 remarks on a question concerning the hypothesis which 

 ought to arise instinctively in the mind of every one. That 

 question is : Does such a conception of psychic life and con- 

 sciousness as that contained in our hypothesis imply any real 

 infringement upon or derogation from me, in the deepest 

 sense a real entity properly designated by the terms -person 

 and personality? 



On saying that this query ought to arise insfinctivrli/, I 

 do not mean ought in the ethical sense, but in the organismal 

 sense. That is, in a sense which imj)lies that the very nature 

 of the conscious organism is that it is not only self-existent 

 in a measure like every natural object, but that it is self-iden- 

 tifiable, and within certain bounds, self-determinative of its 

 own acts. Now recognizing it to Ix? thus by its "very na- 

 ture" is only another way of recognizing that it is so in its 

 instincts as well as in its physical organization. But since 

 instinct is more fundamental, more deep-rooted in the or- 



