Sketch of an Organismal Thcorij of Con.srionstwss 807 



"self" and the "other" of my conception are more per.sonallv 

 objective, and more cosmic in their affinities, than arc tiie 

 "self" and the "other" of social psychology. 



Continuing now with our examination of the foundation 

 of my hypothesis I find it convenient, especially because of 

 my reference a few pages back, to Huxley's unanswerable 

 contention for an essence of truth in both materialism and 

 idealism, to call attention to a natur.il history fact in the 

 higher mental life of man which I take to be a strong con- 

 firmation of the contention. This fact concerns the general 

 difference between what are commonly known as the mate- 

 rialistic and the idealistic attitudes of mind. This difference 

 comes, I believe, to the same thing finally, as the difference 

 between the objective and subjective attitudes, and is also 

 the difference, at bottom, between what in ratlier loose thouifh 

 prevalent expression, is called the difference between the 

 scientific and the philosophic attitudes. It would seem that 

 the philosopher who declares himself to be an Absolute Ideal- 

 ist, as Royce does, is under heavy obligation, especially if 

 he enters the field of psychology, to explain the fact that the 

 originators of great interpretative ideas of nature have in- 

 variably recognized that their hypotheses must be "proved'"; 

 that is, that the subjective experience which constitutes the 

 hypothesis must be found to have its counterpart in tlie ex- 

 ternal world of sense. If "Reason creates the world," even 

 in the recondite meaning of Royce's philoso})hy, how hap- 

 pened it that Newton should have been so "restless" for evi- 

 dence of an objective, an external counterpart to the subjec- 

 tive result he had reached by mathematical reasoning, that 

 he held back liis reasoned creation for sixteen years, waiting 

 for the proof, the sense-perceptual or at least the sense- 

 -perccj)tible experience, that should round out his reasoned 

 truth .'^ May not, I ask, the very kernel of the difference 

 between science at its best and j)lii]os()|)hy at its l)est Ik- in 

 this, that the typical scientist is somewhat deficient in "nst- 



