TEE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. 21 



scientifically. The one naturalist, perhaps too largely 

 assuming the scientifically unexplained to be inexpli- 

 cable, views the phenomena only in their supposed 

 relation to the Divine rnind. The other, naturally 

 expecting many of these phenomena to be resolvable 

 imder investigation, views them in their relations to 

 one another, and endeavors to explain them as far as 

 he can (and perhaps farther) through natural causes. 



But does the one really exclude the other ? Does 

 the investigation of physical causes stand opposed to 

 the theological view and the study of the harmonies 

 between mind and [N'ature ? More than this, is it not 

 most presumable that an intellectual conception re- 

 alized in J^ature would be realized through natural 

 agencies ? Mr. Agassiz answers these questions afiarm- 

 atively when he declares that '^ the task of sciencejs 

 to investigate what has been done^"toTnc[uire if pos- 

 sible hoio it has teen done^ rather than to ask what is 

 possible for the Deity, since we can hiow that onlyhy 

 what actually exists / " and also when he exter ds the 

 argument for the intervention in l!Tature of a creative 

 mind to its legitimate application in the inorganic 

 world; w^hich, he remarks, "considered in the same 

 light, would not fail also to exhibit unexpected evi- 

 dence of thought, in the character of the laws regulat- 

 ing the chemical combinations, the action of physical 

 forces, etc., etc." ^ Mr. Agassiz, however, pronounces 

 that "the connection between the facts is only intel- 

 lectual " — an opinion which the analogy of the inor- 



* Op: cit., p. 131. — One or two Bridgewater Treatises, and most; 

 modern works upon natural theology, should have rendered the evi-. 

 dences of thought in inorganic Nature not " unexpected." 

 2 



