364 DARWmiANA. 



a (lifferent object, sucli as a spider's web, lie would 

 have inferred both design and non-human workman- 

 ship. Of some objects he might be uncertain wheth- 

 er thej were of human origin or not, without ever 

 doubting thej were designed, ' while of others this 

 might remain doubtful. ]^or is man's recognition of 

 human workmanship, or of any other, dependent upon 

 his comprehending how it was done, or what particu- 

 lar ends it subserves. Such considerations make it 

 clear that " the label of human workmanship " is not 

 the generic stamp from which man infers design. It 

 seems equally clear that "the mental operation re- 

 quired in the one case " is not so radically or materially 

 " different from that performed in the other " as this 

 writer would have us suppose. The judgment re- 

 specting a spider's web, or a trap-door spider's dwell- 

 ing, would be the very same in this regard if it pre- 

 ceded, as it occasionally might, all knowledge of 

 whether the object met with were of human or ani- 

 mal origin. A dam across a stream, and the appear- 

 ance of the stumps of trees which entered into its 

 formation, would suggest design quite irrespective of 

 and antecedent to the considerable knowledge or ex- 

 perience which would enable the beholder to decide 

 whether this was the work of men or of beavers. 

 Why, then, should the judgment that any particular 

 structure is a designed work be thought illegitimate 

 when attributed to a higher instead of a lower intelli- 

 gence than that of man ? It might, indeed, be so if 

 the supposed observer had no conception of a power 

 and intelligence superior to his own. But it would 

 \\iQn be more than " irrelevant ; " it would be im- 



