Comte's Positive Philosophy. 139 



not agree with the statement that this admirable 

 arrangement of the sciences represents the true 

 order of their historic development ; and that, 

 while each science has experienced successively 

 the application of the theological, the metaphysi- 

 cal, and the positive methods, the order in which 

 they have attained the positive stage conforms to 

 the order in which they are here placed. We do 

 not believe that any serial arrangement can rep- 

 resent either the true relations of the sciences to 

 each other, or the comparative rapidity with which 

 they have advanced toward perfection. The sim- 

 plicity of the phenomena with which they deal 

 is far from being the only condition which has 

 determined their evolution. And we therefore 

 differ from Mr. Mill in thinking that Mr. Spen- 

 cer has entirely destroyed the pretensions of M. 

 Comte's classification to be considered as founded 

 in the nature of things, however valuable it may 

 be as a help to study. 



It is on his contributions to our knowledge of 

 the laws of social evolution that M. Comte chiefly 

 prides himself. He claims the right to be called 

 the founder and legislator of the science of soci- 

 ety. We are not among the number of those who 

 are disposed to grant him this lofty title. We do 

 not even think that the science of society, as a 



