166 Darwinism and Other Essays. 



think, of emotion to feel. Mr. Buckle falls into 

 exactly the same error in a singular passage in 

 his second volume, where he says : 



The emotions are as much a part of us as the under- 

 standing: they are as truthful; they are as likely to be 

 right. Though their view is different, it is not capri- 

 cious. They obey fixed laws ; they follow an orderly 

 and uniform course ; they run in sequences ; they have 

 their logic and method of inference. l 



All this is either strained metaphor or down- 

 right nonsense. If it were true, what would be 

 the use of making any distinction at all between 

 intellect and feeling? If to feel is to judge, and 

 to experience an emotion is to lay down a prop- 

 osition, why not include both under one name? 

 Mr. Buckle is misled by the fact that, in all our 

 mental operations, feeling and thinking are closely 

 united. Our wishes colour our judgments. We 

 are all led, in many cases, to believe that to be 

 true which we wish to be true. Thus emotional 

 states give rise to intellectual states. On the 

 other hand, Mr. Bain has shown that belief, when 

 active, always leads to volition ; 2 and as volition is 

 the final stage of emotion, we perceive that intel- 

 lectual states likewise occasion emotional states. 



1 Vol. ii. p. 502. 



2 Bain, The Emotion* and the Will, pp. 668-598. 



