METHOD IN SCIENCE 5 



we know, and to ignore them in what we are ignorant of, is 

 intellectual anarchism. 



It may be said that every one admits that general 

 laws apply in all things, and that to insist on the fact is 

 both otiose and absurd. A belief, however, may produce 

 small results if it is not put into practice. Every one, of 

 course, recognizes that nothing whatever occurs anywhere 

 which can contradict the laws of energetics. And yet 

 vitalism flourishes. Almost all will agree that chemistry 

 is capable of becoming in time an exact science, and while 

 yet inexact, has general laws which some day must be shown 

 to exist, even in the realm of what those, who wish to avoid 

 the connotational pitfalls of the word " mind," may be 

 permitted to call "mentation." But, nevertheless, many 

 are prone to argue that conclusions reached in sociology, 

 for instance, can have no meaning for a physiologist, 

 biologist, chemist, or physicist. Though general laws are 

 in action through all nature, their opinion is that any 

 argument founded upon them is an argument from analogy, 

 and a mere illustration. Resting, as they believe securely, 

 on the absurd dictum that it is dangerous to argue from 

 analogy, they refuse to draw any conclusion, even a ten- 

 tative one, by its use, being ignorant of the value placed 

 on such reasoning by a logician like John Stuart Mill, and 

 forgetful that analogy is pure, if incomplete, induction. 

 For it can only be built on facts. 



The bulk of this book was written, and the suggested 

 methods employed, before I became aware that in one place, 

 at least, Herbert Spencer had suggested a way in which 

 sociological problems might give clues to the elucidation 

 of physiological problems. I may, perhaps, be excused for 

 not having read his paper on " Transcendental Physiology ' 

 till lately. Indeed, a great deal of his physiological know- 



