250 KriiJ iif'tuii of Theohujij. 



atheism, whicli is not only the negation of religion, but also 

 of philosophy. Of Agnosticism and Positivism I have not 

 spoken. Agnosticism is simply an attitude of the mind 

 towards all theological specidation, and refuses to enter ui)on 

 it, claiming all such questions to be insolul)le from the 

 nature of the case. Positivism on the theistic side is also 

 agnostic, and therefore devotes itself exclusively to the 

 amelioration of the social order. These, therefore, yield 

 nothing to the history of theism in the way of constructive 

 tliought. 



It is not claimed, and could not be, that religious history 

 shows, in any part of the world, a consecutive development 

 of all these successive phases of theistic belief. In every 

 nation, some one of them has been mostly predominant. 

 l*antheistic and similar vicAvs have been the outcome of 

 individual speculation, at least in later times, and have arisen 

 from the philosophical schools. The tendency of the general 

 movement, however, wherever there has been movement, is 

 along the same lines as in scientific thought, viz., from nar- 

 rower to wider generalization. This is characteristic of it as 

 a whole, — following, thereby, the natural order of the Evolu- 

 tion of Mind, and, so far as it does so, or is allowed freely 

 to do so, progressing from the lower to the higher ideals 

 according to the true law of development.* 



*It is manifestly iinpossil)le to do more than snf:;gest the jxi-iitioa ol the Doc- 

 trine of tlie Absolute, in its relation to i>rior view.-. The object is only to show 

 how it stands related to previous i)hilosoi)hies as the ultimate and necessarily 

 final generalization. We should note, however, that while Mr. Spencer accepts 

 the conclusion above quoted from Dr. Mansel, as a loiiical consequence of his 

 premises, he asserts, nevertheless, the valid existence of what lie terms an 

 '^ indefinite consciousness" ol the Absolute, which, as enterinj,^ necessarily in 

 all contemplation of the Absolute, is an ineradicable factor therein, and that 

 this is the sufficient basis for all essentially religious ideas, whereby in fact all 

 that there is essentially religious in all phases of theistic belief has been pre- 

 served. 



Further discussion here is impossible. The reader must be referred to Mr. 

 Spencer's "First Principles." An interesting and thoughtful criti(iue upon 

 Mr. Spencer's views as to this "indefinite consciousness" considered in reler- 

 ence to, and in comparison with, his doctrine of the relativity of ideas, will lie 

 found in the first part of Prof. ,7ohn Caird's "Philosophy of Religion." Mr. 

 Spencer contends that his doctrine of the Absolute is not a negation: that it 

 is the highest possible affirmation. It is a plenum, and not a vacuum. It is 

 perhajts somewhat unfortunate that he should have entitled the first part of the 

 First Principles, "The Unknowable," thus giving occasion for nmch useless 

 and worthless criticism of the Svnthetic Philosoi)hv as essentially destructive 

 and not constructive. "The Absolute v.s I'nknowable," is the idea therein 

 presented, although the words are used more or less interchangealjly. 



