Evolution of Morals. l'."**.) 



In ethics, it rejects us incompetent all moral judgments 

 based upon experiential tests. 



The actual bearing of the doctrine thus assailed, u])on 

 ethical sanctions, may best be understood by the study of 

 its theory of the genesis and development of the moral 

 sense. It should be said at the outset, however, that the 

 leading representatives of the new school of thought by no 

 means admit the validity of these charges of their critics. 

 The evolution philosophy affirms the supremacy of ethics, 

 and makes moral science the culmination of its entire sys- 

 tem of thought. '' My ultimate ])urpose," says Mr. Spencer, 

 in his preface to the Data of Ethics, "lying behind all 

 proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the princi- 

 ples of right and wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific 

 basis." In its investigation of morals, the new philoso})liy 

 lays its foundation upon the solid rock of fact, as revealed 

 in human experience. Its ethical structure does not rest 

 upon a cloud-falu'ic of theological or metaphysical assump- 

 tion, but upon human nature itself — upon man's natural 

 desire and effort to make the most of life, both in its per- 

 sonal and its social aspects, and upon the observed good or 

 evil effects of actions, judged by this practical test. In 

 collecting and collating its facts, it follows the scientific 

 method — studying man as he exists to-day, and as he has 

 existed throughout the entire period of his evolution. As 

 in the field of the physical sciences, commencing with the 

 historical era, it prolongs its vision into prehistoric times 

 by a legitimate use of the scientific imagination. By the 

 study of savage races and the investigation of language and 

 archaeological remains, it forms a vivid conception of man 

 as he was gradually outgrowing the inheritance of his brute 

 ancestry, and progressing toward civilization. 



Even more deeply than this, the Evolution philosophy 

 searches for facts on which to rest its science of morals. 

 It perceives that moral conduct is only a part of a larger 

 whole — conduct in general. It is necessary, therefore, to 

 study conduct first in its universal aspect, in order rightly 

 to estimate the nature and status of ethical conduct. Con- 

 (hict may be tersely defined, in the language of Mr. Spencer, 

 as " acts adjusted to ends." * It includes only those actions 

 which are accom])anied by volition, excluding those which 

 are automatic and mechani(;al. In the lower forms of or- 



* Spencer's Data of Ethics. 



