Erobttlon of Morals. 267 



necessity for self-sustenauce or race-maintenance, yield 

 greater and greater satisfactions as they become habitual 

 and instinctive. It is entirely natural according to this 

 principle, that altruistic actions, originally initiated from 

 egoistic motives, should be continued, when they become 

 habitual, from higher motives. The original selfish impulse 

 of desire or fear may be Avholly eliminated, and the action 

 may be pursued without thought of ulterior recompense. 

 The child at first shares its playthings with its little com- 

 panions, perhaps, under the stress of paternal compulsion ; 

 but it soon comes to receive pleasure from the perception 

 and sympathetic api)reciation of their pleasure : the gener- 

 ous act brings its own reward. Thus habit, in adai)ting man to 

 Jiis social environment, revolutionizes his ethical point of 

 view. 



Xot only does it induce this change of conscious motive ; 

 it also differentiates the sense of moral obligation from 

 those peremptory selfish instincts in which it has its root, 

 thus creating the imperative impulse of Duty. The " ought " 

 of the Evolution philosophy having been evolved out of the 

 struggle for a larger life, implies the obligation to strive 

 for fulness of life in one's self and in the world at large.* 

 For the service of Self, it substitutes the service of Human- 

 ity. It is more than an impulse to seek one's own imme- 

 diate or proximate advantage and happiness. Interpreted 

 even in egoistic terms, it implies an obligation to seek for 

 the ^^er/eci'w;? of self.f including the perfection of one's 

 moral and spiritual nature ; and to seek it, if need be, there- 

 fore, at the sacrifice of one's immediate personal comfort 

 and happiness. Life is measured, ethically, not by length 

 of years, not even by the present or proximate sum total of 

 the individual activities ; but rather by the sum total of the 

 individuaU s influence in promoting fulness of life in all sen- 

 tient creatures — noiv Uvinrf and yet to be. The conception 

 of moral obligation presented by the new ethics thus accounts 

 for the action of the world's sages, saviours and moral 

 heroes — for that of men like Socrates, Jesus and the Buddha 

 — as well as for that of the conventional well-disposed citi- 

 zen of the well-ordered State ; for there are times when the 

 clear vision of noble souls perceives that only by contempt 

 for the conventional, b}' the overthrow of institutions which 

 have become barriers in the path of human progress, can 



*Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy. t Maude's The Foundation of Ethics. 



