PLATO. 63 



' The Parmenides' is altogether the most mysterious and incompre- 

 hensible of Plato's dialogues. The resolution of all things into one, 

 and the sameness of that one through the changes of all are the grand 

 topic. Great disputes have been maintained about this unity of Par- 

 menides, and some have been willing to identify his notions with the 

 Spinozism of later days. The opinion of Aristotle, 1 independently of 

 other considerations, seems conclusive on this point, and whatever 

 Parmenides might mean, he certainly did not mean any unity of 

 matter. 



It seems well established that Plato at some period visited the Visits 

 court of Dionysius at Syracuse. One visit only of his is mentioned 

 by Diodorus Siculus ; but the spurious letters which have passed under 

 the name of Plato, have given rise to very circumstantial accounts 

 of three different visits. 2 Of that visit which really took place, little 

 can be satisfactorily said ; and instead of dwelling on the fictions with 

 which Plato's biographers have embellished their accounts of his stay 

 in Sicily, we turn to the further consideration of Plato's dialogues. 



* The Philebus' bears throughout marks of a judgment strengthened 

 by experience, and of an imagination and feelings mellowed by age. 

 To a student unacquainted with Plato's writings, and desirous of 

 obtaining a full view of the moral doctrines of his mature years, it 

 deserves to be recommended, both for the graces of the composition, 

 and the sanctity of the precepts which it contains. It is a mass of 

 moral wisdom, inculcated with every charm of manner and sentiment, 

 which can captivate the imagination and interest the heart. It is 

 serious and earnest and affecting. 



* The Commonwealth,' or, as it is perhaps more properly entitled, 

 ' The Dialogue on Justice,' was the production of Plato's mature 

 years, and indeed seems to have been continually revised by him till 



the last hour of his life. The grand object of this dialogue is to prove His doctrine 



that moral virtue is the excellence of human nature; that moral conduct of Vlrtue< 



independently of the accidents of rewards and punishments is suitable 



to the constitution of man. In the first part he shows that what is 



just, is not constituted such by arbitrary enactments, for then what 



was just in one state might be unjust in another, and besides no 



enactment would then be considered unjust. Inferring that there 



must be some other test, he proceeds to consider the human mind, 



and discovers in it three several faculties ; the desire of pleasure, the 



defensive faculty, or the principle of irritation, and Reason. And, as 



it might be difficult to proceed with the consideration of these, as 



each balancing the other, or as severally gaining the ascendency in a 



single mind, he proceeds to examine the analogous parts as they dis- 



play themselves in that large animal, a commonwealth. The sketch, 



therefore, of an ideal commonwealth which is introduced, is merely by 



ply yap 'iotKt rou Kara. %.oyov ivos KrtvtifScti, Mifaffffos $t rou xarat 

 rnv Sx. Arist. Metaph. lib. i. c. 6. 



2 See Mitford's remarks, 'History of Greece,' vol. viii. 



