PLATO. 75 



the human character. But, since perfection is, in fact, not attainable 

 by man, we must proceed in a less elevated strain, and consider whafc 

 is practicable, and give such rules as may be of use in the regulation 

 of conduct. Man's sensations and desires form a very considerable 

 part of his constitution. By these he is influenced in all he does, 

 and upon the nature of these his happiness, in a great degree, de- 

 pends. We certainly ought to commend the most virtuous sort of 

 life, not merely because it is most conducive to good character, but 

 because, if steadily and uniformly pursued from youth upwards, it 

 far exceeds any other in those particulars which are the objects of 

 universal desire, in the attainment of pleasure, and in the exemption 

 from pain. This, indeed, is evidently the case where a man's desires 

 are well regulated. But by what means this just regulation of desire 

 is effected, whether by the power of some inherent and connate facul- 

 ties, or by the light of experience, may require some consideration. 

 But we may form a comparative estimate of the pleasurableness or 

 painfulness of some modes of life upon the following grounds. We 

 wish to partake of pleasure, but pain we neither prefer nor desire. 

 A state of indifference we do not wish for, as compared with plea- 

 sure, but yet we prefer it to pain. Nor can we say that we wish to 

 have an equal share of pleasure, if attended with equal pain. In 

 number, therefore, and magnitude and intensity, pleasures and pains 

 surpass or equal, or are less one than another, as objects whether of 

 desire or of aversion. 



" Such being the state of things, a life, in which there are many of 

 both sorts, and these great and intense, but where the pleasures pre- 

 dominate, we should wish, but where the contrary, we should not wish. 

 So again, a life in which there were few of each sort, and these small 

 and moderate, but where the pains exceeded, we should not wish ; but 

 where the contrary, we should wish. So that where there is an equi- 

 librium of pleasures and pains, the mind feels a kind of indifferency ; 

 it would wish a course of life where the objects of desire preponderate, 

 and would decline a course of life where the objects of aversion pre- 

 ponderate. 



" These are all the different modes of life; and if we imagine there 

 are any others besides these, we only imagine such things from an ig- 

 norance and inexperience of the nature of things. It may be well, 

 therefore, to arrange and classify the different modes of life, that each 

 man, by selecting that which is best calculated to produce a more un- 

 alloyed succession of pleasures, or a greater uniformity and permanence 

 of satisfaction, may so best insure his own general happiness. 



** We may term one sort of life a life of temperance, another of 

 prudence, another of valour, another of health. To these we may op- 

 pose four others, a life of folly, of cowardice, of intemperance, of dis- 

 ease. Whoever is acquainted with a life of temperance, knows that it 

 is moderate in all particulars, that it affords moderate pleasures, mode- 

 rate desires and affections. That an intemperate man is violent in all 



