7 6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 



these particulars; that his pains and pleasures are in excess, that his 

 desires are tempestuous, and his affections frantic and irregular. That 

 in a temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains ; but that in an intem- 

 perate life, the pains exceed the pleasures, in extent, in number, and 

 in intensity. According to the constitution of nature, therefore, one 

 of these modes of life is more agreeable and the other more painful ; 

 and no man who desires to live a life of real enjoyment, would volun- 

 tarily prefer a life of intemperance. If this be so, every intemperate 

 man is such not by the exercise of a free will ; but either from 

 some defect in their understandings, or from the unruliness of their 

 passions, or from a concurrence of these circumstances, the mass of 

 mankind pass their lives destitute of temperance. With regard to a. 

 life of disease or of health, we must form the like reflections ; that 

 they both have their pleasures and their pains; that in a state of 

 health the pleasures exceed the pains, but in a state of disease the 

 pains exceed the pleasures. Now the object of our selection with 

 regard to the modes of life, was not one in which pain predominates ; 

 but, on the contrary, we agreed that was preferable in which the pain 

 was surpassed by the pleasures. But a temperate man surpasses an 

 intemperate one, a prudent man an imprudent one, inasmuch as the 

 pains which he has are fewer, and less intense, and of shorter con- 

 tinuance. The modes of life then of the temperate, the brave, the 

 prudent, and the healthy, are far more desirable than those of the das- 

 tardly, and the intemperate, the imprudent, and the diseased. So that, 

 to sum up all, the man who has any excellence, whether bodily or 

 mental, so far passes a more agreeable life than the man who has any 

 infirmity or depravity. And besides this direct agreeableness, such 

 excellence is preferable on account of its comeliness, its consistency 

 with nature, its serviceableness to others, and the character which ac- 

 companies it. So that one who is blessed with virtuous habits, passes 

 a life more happy than one under opposite circumstances in every par- 

 ticular whatsoever." 



Plato as a As a politician, Plato considered that the great object of laws was 

 ian> to provide for the natural accommodation of the members of the com- 

 munity, as subsidiary and in subordination to the cultivation of their 

 moral virtues. 1 He considered the perfection of the state to consist 

 not solely in the health, beauty, strength, and wealth of the individuals 

 composing it, but also in their prudence, temperance, justice, and for- 

 titude. 8 He complains that legislators in general had only attended to 

 the inferior qualities, and had neglected all the superior, with the ex- 

 ception of fortitude. In Crete and in Sparta, prudence and justice 

 were notoriously disregarded, and temperance was only so far con- 

 sidered, as the practice of it was necessary to one species of fortitude. 3 

 Plato illustrates with great ability the decline and decay of states from 

 that momentary elevation and meridian of grandeur which success in 



1 De Legg. lib. i. Ibid. lib. i. 3 Ibid. lib. i. 



