PLATO, 83 



on to just sentiments, must be adopted. Some minds must be first 

 cleared and purified from idle prepossessions, from vain conceits, from 

 the arrogant imagination that they are already in possession of that 

 very knowledge from which their hearts and understandings are, in 

 fact, entirely alien. The subtile must be met with subtilty, the 

 fantastical must be indulged a little in their whimsies, and be enticed, 

 and allured to more substantial entertainment. The art of conviction 

 is very closely connected with the art of persuasion. And although 

 without a true and sound logic no man can acquire knowledge worth 

 imparting, so, on the other hand, without proper rhetorical skill, the 

 most important knowledge of a practical nature must remain unim- 

 parted or imparted to little purpose. 



Such seem to have been Plato's general notions on the subjects of 

 logic and rhetoric. But it has so happened that his animadversions 

 on the technical refinements, the jingling tricks and fopperies of con- 

 temporary rhetoricians, have been misconceived, as if they involved a 

 general and indiscriminate censure on the art of rhetoric. The object 

 of Plato was very different, as will appear to any one who carefully 

 studies his dialogues connected with that subject. He merely endea- 

 vours to inculcate that the faculty of using words without a real 

 knowledge of the subjects discussed, is but empty babbling ; and that 

 any art which would attempt to show that the opposite sides of every 

 question are equally capable of argument and proof, must be grounded 

 either in the ignorance or in the imposture of its professors. 



That the view which we have taken of Plato's doctrine on this 

 head is the just one, will be seen at once from the following abstract 

 or condensed arrangement of the principal arguments used in the 

 ' Phaedrus,' for which we are principally indebted to an essay by 

 Mr. Geddes, on the composition of the ancients, which contains, 

 amongst other things, some very valuable illustrations of Plato. 



" 1 ask you," says Socrates, " does not eloquence allure and persuade Abstract of 

 the mind, not merely in courts of justice, and other public assemblies, the Phsedrus - 

 but in private parties likewise, where men discuss topics of more or 

 less importance? Is it not for their honour to deliberate justly in 

 matters of small as well as of great moment? By Jove, answered 

 Pha?drus, I never heard that oratory was displayed anywhere else than Oratory, 

 at public trials, or in speeches addressed to the people. What then, 

 Phaedrus, is it the opposite parties do in courts of justice ? Do they 

 not contradict one another ? They do. With regard to what is just, 

 and to what is unjust ? Yes. He who does this by art can make 

 the same things appear just to the same persons at one time, and at 

 another unjust ? He can. And in a public oration, he can represent 

 the same things useful to the public this day, and the next, injurious ? 

 This art then of debating or contradicting being in fact one and the 

 same, may not only be exercised in public meetings, and the business 

 transacted there, but likewise in every other affair ? Answer me, then, 

 and say, whether does a deception happen in things which differ 



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