84 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 



widely, or things which differ but little ? In the latter. If, in going 

 from a thing to its opposite, you proceed gradually, will not the tran-: 

 sition be more insensible than if made suddenly ? Certainly. He, 

 therefore, who would impose upon another, without being himself de- 

 ceived, must have an accurate knowledge of things which resemble, 

 and things which do not resemble one another ? He mypst. Is it 

 possible for a person who is ignorant of the truth, in any one thing, to 

 judge of its greater or less similitude with other things? By no 

 means. Consequently, those who are deceived, and who form opinions 

 contrary to the nature of things, are led astray by false appearances or 

 similitudes? They are. Well, then, is it in the power of any man 

 who does not himself understand the nature of things, artfully and in- 

 sensibly to draw off his hearers by delusive resemblances from truth 

 to falsehood ? Not at all. Whoever, therefore, my friend, is igno- 

 rant of truth, and guided by opinions, must appear ridiculous, and un- 

 acquainted with his art when he attempts to persuade ; he, who would 

 excel in oratory, ought first, to form just notions, and to understand 

 the true character of every species of things, and hence be enabled to 

 judge when the people are likely to be deceived, and when not? He 

 would be a happy man, Socrates, who possessed that knowledge. 

 Moreover, when he has to describe anything, none of its properties 

 ought to escape him, but he ought at one glance to discover to what 

 species his subject belongs : an oration ought in its composition to re- 

 semble an animal, which has its own body, head, and feet, and its 

 middle extremities, and every member and part correspondent to each 

 other, and to the whole. It ought not to be a matter of indifference, 

 whether what is said' first might as well be last, or the contrary. 

 These observations, Phsedrus, are not, however, so important as the 

 two following ones. What are these ? First, it would be well for 

 us if we could collect many remote qualities, and reduce them into one 

 kind ; and by defining everything, give a distinct idea of the subject : 

 in this manner we have endeavoured to define love, and ascertain its 

 meaning. Well, what is the other ? It is this. To be capable of 

 subdividing each species into its natural and peculiar division without, 

 like an unskilful artizan, breaking any of its parts. I am in love, 

 Phaedrus, with such divisions and compositions, as by them I am 

 enabled to reason, and to speak justly ; if I find a person, who can 

 discover one and many, as they are in nature, I follow him step by 

 step as a kind of Deity : God knows if I am right for esteeming those 

 so highly who argue in this manner, and in calling them as I do, masters 

 in the dialectic. But we have not yet discovered what rhetoric is. How 

 do you mean, Socrates ? We must pronounce what remains to be said 

 upon oratory. You know, Socrates, there are many famous treatises 

 written upon this subject? Well suggested. The proem is the first 

 part of an oration, and is frequently adorned with great art ? It 

 is. The second part contains a narration t with the evidence of the 

 facts ; the third and fourth parts consist of conjectures and presump- 



