MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO. 215 



that there is a wide difference between calmly deciding on an abstract 

 point, and acting on that decision in the hurry of real life ; that Cicero 

 in fact was apt to fancy (as all will fancy when assailed by interest or 

 passion,) that the circumstances of his case constituted it an exception 

 to the broad principles of duty. As he eloquently expresses himself 

 in his defence of Plancius : " Neque enim inconstantis puto, sententiam, 

 tanquam aliquod navigium, et cursum, ex reipublicse tempestate 

 moderari. Ego vero hsec didici, hasc vidi, haec scripta legi ; haec de 

 sapientissimis et clarissimis viris, et in hac republica, et in aliis civi- 

 tatibus, monumenta nobis literae prodiderunt ; non semper easdem 

 sententias ab iisdem, sed quascunque reipublicaa status, incliuatio 

 temporum, ratio concordiaa postularet, esse defendendas." 1 



Thus he seems to consider it the duty of a mediator alternately 2 to 

 praise and blame both parties more than truth allows, if by these 

 means it be possible either to flatter or to frighten them into an adop- 

 tion of temperate measures. 



But the argument of the objectors proceeds on an entire miscon- The Phiio- 

 ception of the design and purpose with which the ancients prosecuted anclentsf th 

 philosophical studies. The motives and principles of morals were Dot more specu- 

 so seriously acknowledged as to lead to a practical application of them 

 to the conduct of life. Even when they proposed them in the form 

 of precept, they still regarded the perfectly virtuous man as the 

 creature of their imagination rather than a model for imitation a 

 character whom it was a mental recreation rather than a duty to 

 contemplate ; and if an individual here or there, as Scipio or Cato, 

 attempted to conform his life to his philosophical conceptions of virtue, 

 he was sure to be ridiculed for singularity and affectation. 



Even among the Athenians, by whom philosophy was, in many 

 cases, cultivated to the exclusion of every active profession, intellectual 

 amusement, not the discovery of truth, was the principal object of 

 their discussions. That we must thus account for the ensnaring ques- 

 tions and sophistical reasonings of which their disputations consisted, 

 has been noticed in our article on LOGIC ; 3 and it was their extension 

 of this system to the case of morals, which brought upon their sophists 

 the irony of Socrates, and the sterner rebuke of Aristotle. But if this 

 took place in a state of society in which the love of speculation 

 pervaded all ranks, much more was it to be expected among the 



1 C. 39. [" Xor do I regard it as any mark of inconsistency to regulate my 

 opinions and my course, like a vessel, by the condition of the political weather. 

 All that 1 have learned, witnessed, and read all that has been recorded of the 

 wisest and most illustrious men, both in our state and in other political commu- 

 nities, has taught me that the same man is not always to defend the same opinions, 

 but rather those which the position of the state, the bias of the times, and the 

 interests of peace may require." Editor."] 



* Ad Fam. vi. 6, vii. 3. 'I5i ffwefiov\evev 6 Ki/cepw?/, 7ro/\.Aa /it-j/ Kaura/?i 

 ypatycav, iro\\a 5'avrov no/X7T7]'iou Seoy.ez/os, Trpauj/cuj/ eKarepov xal Trapajji.v8ovfj.eyos. 

 Plutarch, in Vita Cic. See also in Vita Pomp. 



3 In the Philosophical division of the Encyclopaedia Metropolitan . 



