222 ROMAN PHILOSOPHY. 



mind is divided (-irepiffTrdrai) from the impression he has of her death ; 

 he asks aXX' i]v tdairTov ttcropw ajuapr' tpr]v ; (' Ale.' 1148.) Her- 

 cules resolves his difficulty, and his (fravraaia becomes aTrep/o-Traoroc. 

 The suspension then of assent (iiroyri) which the Academics enjoined, 

 was, at least from the times of Carneades, 1 nearly a speculative doc- 

 trine ; 2 and herein lay the chief difference between them and the 

 Pyrrhonists; that the latter altogether denied the existence of the 

 probable, while the former admitted there was sufficient to allow of 

 action, provided we pronounced absolutely on nothing. 



Causes which Little more can be said concerning the opinions of a sect whose 



New 6 the fundamental maxim was that nothing could be known, and nothing 



Academy a should be taught. It lay midway between the other philosophies ; 



Rhetoric an( ^ ^ n ^ e altercations of the various schools it was at once attacked 



by all, 3 yet appealed to by each of the contending parties, if notto 



countenance its own sentiments, at least to condemn those advocated 



by its opponents, 4 and thus to perform the office of an umpire. 5 From 



this necessity then of being prepared on all sides for attack, 6 it became 



as much a school of rhetoric as of philosophy, 7 and was celebrated 



among the ancients for the eloquence of its masters. 8 Hence also its 



reputation was continually vaiying : for, requiring the aid of great 



abilities to maintain its exalted and arduous post, it alternately rose 



and fell in estimation, according to the talents of the individual who 



happened to fill the chair. 9 And hence the frequent alterations 



which took place in its philosophical tenets ; which, depending rather 



1 Numen. apud Euseb. Prsep. Evang. xiv. 7. 



2 Lucullus, 31, 34 ; de Off. ii. 2 ; de Fin. v. 26 ; Quint, xii. 1. 



3 Lucullus, 22, et alibi ; Tusc. Qusest. ii. 2. 



4 See a striking passage from Cicero's Academics, preserved by Augustin, contra 

 Acad. iii. 7, and Lucullus, 18. 



5 De Nat. Deor. passim; de Div. ii. 72. "Quorum controversiam solebat tan- 

 quam honorarius arbiter judicare Carneades." Tusc. Qusest. v. 41. 



6 De Fin. ii. 1 ; de Orat. i. 18 ; Lucullus, 3 ; Tusc. Qusest. v. 11 ; Numen. apud 

 Euseb. Prsep. Evang. xiv. 6, &c. ; Lactantius, Inst. iii. 4. 



1 De Nat. Deor. i. 67; de Fat. 2 ; Dialog, de Orat. 31, 32. 



8 Lucullus vi. 18 ; de Orat. ii. 38, iii. 18 ; Quint. Inst. xii. 2 ; Plutarch, in vit3 

 Caton. et Cic. ; Lactantius, Inst. ; Numen. apud Euseb. 



9 " Hsec in philosophic ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte 

 judicandi, profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade, usque ad 

 nostram viguit aetatem ; quam nunc propemodum orbam esse in ipsa GrseciEi intel- 

 ligo. Quod non Academic vitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitror contigisse. Nam 

 si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes ? quod facere iis 

 necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri reperiendi causi, et contra omnes philosophos 

 et pro omnibus dicere." De Nat. Deor. i. 5. [" This principle in philosophy, of 

 arguing against all propositions, and openly determining nothing, originated by 

 Socrates, renewed by Arcesilas, and confirmed by Carneades, has been in force up to 

 our own day, but is now, I understand, even in Greece, almost destitute of an 

 advocate. This, I apprehend, is not ascribable to any fault of the Academy, but to 

 the dullness of individuals. For, if it is a great task to acquire the philosophy of 

 any one school, how much greater to attain those of all ? which, nevertheless, is 

 necessary for those who, for the investigation of truth, would be prepared to dispute 

 for and against all the philosophical sects." Editor.'} 



