224 ROMAN PHILOSOPHY. 



least pursues the useful and the magnificent in philosophy ; and uses 

 his academic character as a pretext rather fora judicious selection from 

 each system, than for an indiscriminate rejection of all. 1 Thus, in the 

 capacity of a statesman, he calls in the assistance of doctrines, which, 

 as an orator, he does not scruple to deride ; those of Zeno in particular, 

 who maintained the truth of the popular theology, and the divine origin 

 of augury, and (as we noticed above) was more explicit than the other 

 masters in his view s of social duty. This difference of sentiment between 

 the magistrate and the pleader is strikingly illustrated in the opening 

 of his treatise ' de Legibus ;' where, after deriving the principles of 

 law from the nature of things, he is obliged to beg quarter of the 

 Academics, whose reasonings he feels could at once destroy the founda- 

 tion on which his argument rested. " Ad respublicas firmandas, et 

 ad stabiliendas vires, sanandos populos, omnis nostra pergit oratio. 

 Quocirca vereor cornmittere, ut non bene pro visa et diligenter explo- 

 rata principia ponantur : nee tamen ut omnibus probentur (nam id 

 fieri non potest), sed ut iis, qui omnia recta atque honesta per se ex- 

 petenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod 

 per se ipsum laudabile esset, aut certe nullum habendum magnum 

 bonum, nisi quod vere laudari sua sponte posset." 2 And then ap- 

 parently alluding to the arguments of Carneades against justice, which 

 he had put into the mouth of Philus in the third book of his ' de 

 Republics,' he proceeds : " Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum 

 Academiam, hancab Arcesil& et Carneade recentem, exoremus, ut sileat. 

 Nam, si invaserit in hasc, quae satis scite nobis instructa et composita 

 videntur, nimias edet ruinas. Quam quidem ego placare cupio, sub- 

 movere non audeo." 3 



if I have applied myself especially to this philosophy, through any love of display 

 or ambition of excelling, I not only hold my folly amenable to condemnation, but 

 my very character and nature ; and, therefore, if I did not consider it absurd, in 

 an argument like this, to do what is sometimes done in political discussions, I would 

 swear by Jupiter and the gods Penates that I burn with an earnest desire of dis- 

 covering the truth, and believe all that I say." Editor.'] 



1 " Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcunque maxime 

 probabile occurrat, id nostra jure liceat defendere." De Off. iii. 4. [" Our Academy, 

 however, grants us considerable licence, so that we may defend, by our own right, 

 whatever occurs to us as most probable." Editor. ~\ See also Tusc. Qusest. iv. 4, 

 v. 29 ; de Invent, ii. 3. 



2 [" All our argument is directed to the consolidation of states, the stability of 

 their power, the sound condition of their population. Accordingly, I dread any 

 failure in laying down well-considered and carefully-examined principles : not such,, 

 indeed, as shall meet universal approval (for that is impossible), but such as shall 

 commend themselves to those who hold all upright and honourable objects to be in 

 themselves deserving pursuit, and regard nothing as good which is not of itself 

 praiseworthy ; or, at least, nothing as eminently good which is not intrinsically an 

 object of just commendation." Editor."] 



8 De Legg. i. 13. [" But let us entreat the Academy this new Academy I mean, 

 the school of Arcesilas and Carneades the disturber of all these things to be 

 silent. For should that school attack our arguments, skilfully as they seem to us to 

 be framed and arranged, too much havoc would ensue. I would wish, then, to 

 conciliate the Academy ; remove it I dare not." Editor."] 



