258 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 



to be in itself an ultimate object of desire ; and as we have seen, that 

 they considered the appetites merely as modes of self-love, or expres- 

 sions of the endeavour after perfection, it was in perfect consistency 

 with such principles, that they held the virtues, and the acquisitions of 

 science, to be desirable in themselves, without reference to the benefits 

 resulting from them to the individual, or to the community. 



The great excellence of the Stoical morals consisted in the elevation 

 which they gave to the sense of duty. When the understanding once 

 ascertained what was proper to be done, the dictates of an enlightened 

 conscience were, in their estimation, the universal and invariable rale 

 of conduct. Their moral rules, though they may sometimes sound as 

 if they had a speculative cast, were all applied to, and intended for, 

 sound practical use. They considered the conclusions of experience 

 respecting the happiness of mankind, as the voice of nature announcing 

 the destinations and duties of individuals. No progress can be made 

 towards the perfection, scarcely any even to the development, of the 

 human faculties, without society. Society, therefore, is the natural state 

 of man ; the nature of his body and his mind as clearly indicating, that 

 it was intended by Providence that he should live in a social state, as 

 the structure of other animals shows them to be adapted to the peculiar 

 elements in which they live. The faculty of reasoning and language 

 prove that man was intended for intercourse of this kind, as clearly as 

 the construction of his lungs indicates that he was calculated for the 

 atmosphere which he respires. The moment that the social nature of 

 man is recognised by the understanding, the duties which that condition 

 involves are implicitly comprehended as matters of paramount import- 

 ance. The process by which, in general, the affections extend them- 

 selves from the individual to his home, his country, and mankind at 

 large, is indeed somewhat reversed in the reflective and unimpassioned 

 system of the Stoics ; and the pupils of that school are taught rather 

 to know their duties, by applying the conclusions of their reason to 

 their particular situation, than to feel them by having their sympathies 

 gradually expanded. But the coincidence between these deductions 

 of the understanding, and the natural suggestions of the heart, is 

 mutually illustrative of both. 



ideal perfec- The character which the Stoics have given of a wise man has been 

 i!uman the occasion of much misrepresentation. It was their aim to describe 

 character. suc h a being as should be a constant model for the admirers of virtue 

 to mould their own characters by, as far as human infirmities would 

 permit. So far were the pupils of the Stoical school from pretending 

 that they had attained such a degree of perfection themselves, that 

 they expressly declared that their great masters, Zeno, Cleanthes, and 

 Chrysippus, were themselves far deficient, and that although worthy of 

 all veneration, they did not attain to the ideal of human excellence. 

 The Stoic masters in their description of the wise man have, as might 

 be expected, concurred in accumulating such qualities as tend to make 

 a man at once most independent and most useful to others ; thus 



