SEXTUS EMPIEICUS. THE PYRRHONISTS. 275 



into three classes : the Dogmatists, such as were the Peripatetics, the Analysis of 

 Epicureans, and the Stoics, who asserted that they had discovered institutes"" 

 truth ; the Academics, who denied the possibility of such a discovery; 

 and the Sceptics, who neither asserted nor denied, but doubted. He 

 then proceeds to explain the character and arguments of the latter 

 sect. Scepticism is defined to be, the art of comparing in every way Definition of 

 sensibles and intelligibles, the reports of our senses and the concep- Sc ep ticism - 

 tions of our minds. The end of this comparison is to find as strong 

 reasons for the rejection as for the admission of any point whatever. 

 The great principle on which the whole system is allowed to rest, is, Funda- 

 that to every proposition a contrary proposition possessing equal ^p{^ tal prin " 

 weight may be opposed. This maxim, however, was not laid down 

 as incontrovertible. The Sceptic perceived the inconsistency of assert- 

 ing that no assertion is true, and therefore consented to doubt even 

 whether he doubted. He agreed, moreover, with the mass of mankind 

 respecting appearances ; but he hesitated to receive opinions founded 

 on them, with regard to the real nature of things. His conduct was 

 consequently regulated in compliance with the state of established 

 usages and institutions. In theory, he withheld his assent from the 

 most general maxims of physics and of morals, because he did not see 

 any infallible criterion by which he could distinguish truth from false- 

 hood ; in practice, he followed the instinct of nature, the bent of 

 passion, the laws of society, and the common rules of art and science. 

 His speculations, however, though confessedly not productive of any 

 alteration in the employments of life, were represented as leading to 

 results of a most important nature. The entire suspension of judg- End of 

 ment (eiroxn) induced by the impossibility of discerning reality from ^me'S 

 illusion, in our internal thoughts and external impressions, was said to by which it 

 beget a state of perfect indifference and tranquillity, a total freedom ls obtamed - 

 from the fretful variety of cares and sorrows which agitate the human 

 breast. The Sceptic pursues not with feverish anxiety what cannot 

 be shown to be really good ; he shuns not in perpetual alarm what 

 cannot be proved to be essentially evil. The process by which this 

 mental imperturbability (arapa^ia) was effected, is described as entirely 

 fortuitous. As Apelles, despairing to imitate the foam in his cele- 

 brated picture of a horse, flung against it his sponge, still stained with 

 the different colours which he used, and thus, by a fortunate accident, 

 produced that exact effect which the most exquisite skill was incapable 

 of accomplishing : so the Sceptic, who had attempted the separation of 

 truth from falsehood, with a view of releasing his mind from the 

 troubles which oppressed it, unable to attain this object, suffered his 

 judgment to remain suspended by the equal force of contrary reasons, 

 and through this very suspension eventually obtained that tranquillity 

 which he sought in vain from another source. 



In order to maintain this desirable indecision, the Sceptic resorted to Sceptical 

 a variety of methods, which were dexterously opposed to the several 

 arguments of the Dogmatists. He endeavoured to show, that the 



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