276 GEEEK PHILOSOPHY. 



evidence derived from our perceptions was, considered under every 

 Difference point of view, fallacious. For, in the first place, since animals, arising 

 aSmXs. f rom different species and in different manners, possess a different con- 

 formation of the organs of sense, they cannot be affected in the same 

 way by the same external objects. But, as the parts of the. material 

 world seem to us of different colours, in consequence of the jaundice 

 or a suffusion, and of different figures, according as we press the sides 

 of the eye, or as we view them in convex or concave mirrors ; so it is 

 possible that animals, some of whom have the eye red, some white, 

 some narrow, some oblique, some prominent, some depressed, receive 

 impressions from objects dissimilar from those which they convey to 

 man. And the same remark is equally applicable to the remaining 

 senses. Even as digested food becomes veins, arteries, bones, or 

 sinews, according to the difference of the recipient parts, or as water, 

 when poured on plants, becomes bark, boughs, or fruits ; so he con- 

 cludes that objects are variously felt, according to the constitution and 

 temperament of the animal creation. Indeed, it must be in conse- 

 quence of the incongruity of their sensations, that the same substance 

 is eagerly desired by some, and utterly loathed by others ; and that 

 what is wholesome to one class is deadly to another. If, therefore, 

 the question be put to the Sceptic, whether hemlock be nourishment 

 or poison, he will answer, that it is the former to quails, the latter 

 to men ; but he will cautiously avoid pronouncing that it is either the 

 one or the other, in the nature of things. For man, being an inte- 

 rested party, cannot be qualified to judge between his own sensations 

 and those of animals, in order to decide to which the preference ought 

 justly to be given. Nor can any demonstration be adduced; for 

 though the demonstration be apparent to us, to determine on that ac- 

 count that it is true, is to assume the very point which it was meant 

 to prove. 



Diversity of The Sceptic, having thus far reasoned to show that man has no 

 men. right to pretend that his own perceptions are more correspondent with 



the real nature of things than those of animals termed irrational, is 

 willing to argue even on the supposition that men have the exclusive 

 privilege of discerning truth, and to evince that a suspension of judg- 

 ment is even then altogether necessary. So various are the corporeal 

 frames and constitutions of mankind, that the same objects produce 

 different effects upon different persons, and it is impossible to be certain 

 that our particular apprehension is entitled to superior credit. We 

 cannot, he will add, place confidence in all men, for we should thus 

 admit the most palpable contradictions ; we cannot discover, by a re- 

 view of the universe, on what side the majority of mankind in any 

 question ought to be ranked ; and if we are required to follow a few, 

 we must immediately ask, who are these few ? the Platonists will 

 refer us to Plato, the Epicureans to Epicurus ; and, amidst this con- 

 trariety, the Sceptic will rest in his usual indecision. 



After having thus argued on the concession, that men in general 



