SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. THE PYERHONISTS. 277 



have the power of judging, he will consent to meet his adversaries Diversity of 

 even by granting, that there may be some one individual on whom JJJJJ man he 

 reliance might possibly be placed, and he will merely ask, to which of 

 the senses of this individual must credit be attached ? For different 

 organs present things in different modes. Painting sets forth to the 

 sight some objects as standing out, others as sinking backwards, but 

 to the touch the picture presents no inequalities. Honey, which is 

 luscious to the palate, is offensive to the eye ; and balm, which is de- 

 lightful to the organs of smell, is repulsive to those of taste. It is, 

 besides, impossible to ascertain, whether substances have all the quali- 

 ties which they appear to possess ; or only one quality, which seems 

 different, owing to the diversity of our senses ; or many more qualities 

 than our limited number of senses is capable of perceiving. And if 

 our senses cannot comprehend external objects, neither can our intel- 

 lectual faculties arrive at the knowledge of their real nature, and sus- 

 pension is again requisite. 



But still the Sceptic is content to pursue the discussion, and to Different 

 grant to his adversary, for the sake of argument, that we can confide states of tne 



/* * i i i i- -Hi same senses. 



m one sense of one individual ; yet, again, this one sense will be 

 variously disposed, according as its possessor is young or old, in health 

 or in sickness, asleep or awake, sated or hungry, or, in short, agitated 

 by one or more of the numerous passions, owing to which the senses 

 give different reports, and the understanding forms different deductions. 

 All, therefore, that can be asserted of anything is, that it appears to 

 us in a certain manner, at a certain period of life, and under certain 

 circumstances ; but that we know not whether it be really such in its 

 nature. For, continues the Sceptic, by introducing one of his favourite 

 cavils, it cannot be proved that one of these states is preferable to 

 another, unless we have some criterion which itself can only be made 

 credible by a demonstration. But how can the demonstration be 

 judged to be true but by a criterion ? The demonstration, therefore, 

 will require a criterion to confirm it, while the criterion requires a 

 demonstration to prove it true. 



Thus the Sceptic having, with an air of triumph, destroyed by his 

 alternate method both the demonstration and the criterion, by which 

 alone one sensation can he shown to be preferable to another, finds an 

 additional reason for his boasted suspension. He proceeds, however, 

 to confirm it by several other commonplaces. He urges the dissirni- Situation and 

 larity of objects in consequence of distance, place, and position : the 

 same tower from afar seems round, from a nearer point square ; the 

 same oar under water seems broken, above water straight ; the same 

 light in the sunshine is dim, in darkness bright ; the same image, 

 which when laid flat, seems smooth, when inclined, seems uneven ; 

 the same feathers on the dove's neck assume various hues, according 

 as they are variously turned. 1 Now, since there is nothing which is 



1 Compare Senec. Nat. Qusest. lib. i. c. 5, and Tertullian, de Anim. c. 17. The 

 arguments of the latter have been sketched by Bishop Kaye, with great perspicuity, 



