278 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 



not in some position and place, and at some distance, the absolute 

 nature of things is undiscoverable, and their appearance only can be 

 determined according to these three points. 



Mixtures in He derives another argument from the mixtures in the objects which 

 which? 6 !? P resent themselves to our senses. The images which proceed from 

 sent them- surrounding objects reach us not in a pure and uncompounded state, 

 senses t0the but tnev are blended and modified by the medium through which 

 they pass ; for the same thing will wear a different aspect, as the im- 

 pressions take place through a medium which is warm or cold, dry or 

 moist, curved or straight, broad or narrow, hence the varieties of 

 sounds, smells, and colours. And that, too, without mentioning the 

 coats and humours of the eye, through which the images of objects, 

 with all their external admixtures, are conveyed. And as the senses 

 err, so also will the intellect, which is guided by them. err. Indeed 

 it is possible, that the intellect itself produces an alteration in what it 

 receives from the senses, in consequence of the humours which exist in 

 its material seat. 



Quantity and But, besides this, the Sceptic will urge the confusion which arises 

 fr m tfte quantity and constitution of the subject. For instance, the 

 shavings of goat's horn seem white, though the horn itself seems 

 black ; and filings of silver seem black, though silver itself seems 

 white ; grains of sand, which are rough and uneven, when viewed 

 singly, are smooth and plane, when viewed jointly ; the same medicine, 

 which, in a small quantity, refreshes and heals, in a larger, oppresses 

 and destroys. All, therefore, that can be asserted of an object is, that 

 it appears in a certain manner, when in a certain quantity, and in a 

 certain state ; but not that it is such in its nature. 



Eelation. He will contend, moreover, that all things are relative : relative to 



the thing which judges, namely, the animal, the man, the sense, and the 

 state of the sense ; relative to things seen with it, to the composition, 

 quantity, and position of objects ; relative also as genus and species, as 

 like and unlike, as equal and unequal. And of this relation alone can 

 we be assured. 



Frequency He likewise draws an argument from frequency and rareness of 

 or rareness of occurrence : comets attract more attention than the sun, because seen 



occurrence. ,/.*,, , 1/^1 



less often ; gold is more prized than water, because more rarely found : 

 but let the novelty alter, and language will alter ; the sun will be 

 more admired than comets, and water more valued than gold ; so that 

 there is no fixed measure by which we can determine the intrinsic 

 merit of anything. 



Variety of But the Sceptic borrows his most powerful argument from the ac- 

 tuo'nT Stl ~ knowledged variety of laws, customs, institutions, fabulous creeds, 

 fables, per- and dogmatic opinions. By constantly opposing all these with promp- 



in his excellent analysis of the Treatise De Anima (Eceles. Hist, of the Second and 

 Third Centuries, illustrated from the writings of Tertullian, p. 200). The reason- 

 ing of the Sceptic drawn from the deceptibility of the senses is ridiculed by Epic- 

 tetus. (Ap. Arrian, lib. ii. Diss. c. 20.) 



