SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. THE PYKRHONISTS. 279 



titude and address, and by showing them to be repugnant and destruc- 

 tive one to another, he learns to repeat with additional confidence the 

 necessity of a complete indecision. 



It were unnecessary to detail all the other methods, however in- other 

 genious, which .Sextos has enumerated. It is sufficient to observe, 

 that by their means the Pyrrhonist was furnished with a kind of 

 panoply of cavils against every species of reasoning. If an hypothesis 

 was made, he would counterpoise it by some contrary hypothesis; if Reduction ad 

 a proof was offered, he would ask how the proof itself was demon- mfimtum - 

 strated ; and, if an additional proof was given, he would require this 

 additional proof to be proved, and so on ad infinitum. 



But why, it may be asked, such subtile definitions of terms, if all Observations 

 is equally uncertain ? Why such careful attempts to avoid confusion, p^^, nfc 

 if all is equally confused ? Why pretend to understand the systems Philosophy, 

 of the Dogmatists, if nothing can be understood ? Why determine contradic- 

 that their proofs are weak, if man is not qualified to determine any- turns, 

 thing ? Why style those who mistake his object ignorant, unless the 

 Sceptic himself possess some knowledge of which they are exempt? 1 

 How can one hypothesis be opposed to another, unless that other be 

 comprehended ? How is it ascertained that contrary reasons of equal 

 force can be raised against other reasons, unless equality of force can 

 be inferred ? And, if as many and as valid arguments may be urged 

 in favour of any one proposition as against it, what shadow of use can 

 all his own reasoning possess ? Might not the Dogmatist turn round 

 on the Sceptic, and accuse him of obstinate dogmatism of believing 

 everything of asserting everything ; and when the disciple of Pyrrho 

 replied, " Nay, but I assert nothing, I believe nothing ;" might not the 

 same Dogmatist exclaim, " I maintain that you are one of my sect, and 

 to every argument you may bring to show the contrary, I will affirm 

 that a contrary argument of as much weight may be opposed to it; 

 things seem to me different from what they seem to you, and you have no 

 right to suppose your own senses are superior to mine : nay, be not 

 indignant, if you attempt to give me a proof that you are not a Dog- 

 matist, on your own principles I will require a proof of that proof, and 

 so on without end." 



Indeed the great body of the Tyrrhenian philosophy seems to have Considera- 

 depended on no better assertion than the following : some things are JJJ?^ t on lts 

 false, therefore, perhaps, all things are false; some men differ in 

 opinion, therefore, perhaps, no man's opinion is correct. But the 

 Pyrrhonist urged, that the effects of his system were an unvaried state 

 of internal tranquillity. It requires but little knowledge of human 

 nature to be convinced of the falsehood of this assertion. There will 

 always be the reaction of a natural propensity to belief against the 

 pressure of adopted doubt, and this struggle will necessarily destroy 

 the mental equipoise. The truth of this fact is abundantly exempli- 

 fied in the history of man : Sylla, Tiberius, Louis XI. of France, not 

 1 See the objections more fully stated in Crousaz's Examen du Pyrrhonisme. 



