APPENDIX II. 



ARISTOTLE ON INDUCTION. 



1. " Induction is nothing but the Syllogism without a middle 

 term." (Prior Anal. n. 12.) 



2. " Induction is the pathway which leads from the particular to 

 the general." (Topics i. 10.) 



3. "There is no induction without generality." (Pr. An. 



II. 22.)* 



4. " Induction is a progression from singulars to universals. . . 

 It is more persuasive, clear, more known according to the sense, and 

 common to many things ; syllogism, on the other hand, is more 

 cogent and efficient against opponents in disputation " (on account 

 of the presence of the middle term). (Top. i. 12.) 



5. " We believe all things either through syllogism or from in- 

 duction. . , . Induction, then, is the inductive syllogism. ... It 

 is occurrent in those demonstrations which are proved without a 

 middle term. . . . Induction is more evident" (because general). 

 (Prior An. n. 23.) 



6. "Universals (general laws) depend upon induction, but in- 

 duction depends upon sense." ..." It is (also) clear that if any 

 sense be deficient, a certain science must also be deficient (i.e., a 

 blind man could not study colours, astronomy) . , . since we learn 

 either by induction or by demonstration. Now, demonstration 

 is from universals, but induction from particulars (/.<?., particular 

 facts). ... It is impossible for those who have no sense to make 

 an induction, for sense is conversant with singulars (i.e., particular 

 facts), since the knowledge of them cannot be received, nor can 

 that knowledge be obtained from universals without induction > 

 nor through induction without sense." (Post An. i. 18.) 



* " f] cnroTwv KCL& e'/caoroi/ fin ra KadoXov c(po8os." 



