344 BEHAVIOR OF THE LOWER ORGANISMS 



physiological states after repetition. While possibly our statement of this 

 law may not be entirely adequate, there would seem to be nothing im- 

 plied by it that is specifically vital, in the sense that it differs in essential 

 principle from the methods of action seen in the inorganic world. This 

 law of the readier resolution of physiological states after repetition pre- 

 sents indeed many analogies with various chains of physical and chemi- 

 cal action. 1 It certainly by no means requires in itself the action of any 

 "final cause," that is, of an entity that is at the same time purpose 

 and cause. On the other hand, it undoubtedly does produce that type 

 of behavior which has given rise to the conception of the purpose acting 

 as cause. This conception is in itself of course a correct one, so far as 

 we mean by a purpose an actual physiological state of the organism, 

 determining behavior in the same manner as other factors determine it. 

 But such a physiological state (subjectively a purpose) is a result of a 

 foregoing objective cause, and acts to produce an effect in the same way 

 as any other link in the causal chain. It would seem therefore to pre- 

 sent no basis for theories of vitalism, so far as these depend on anything 

 like the action of final causes. 



That regulation takes place in the behavior of many animals in the 

 manner above sketched may be affirmed as a clearly established fact, 

 and it seems to be perhaps the only intelligible way in which regulatory 

 behavior could be developed in a given individual. 



But we are, of course, confronted by the fact that many individuals 

 are provided at birth with definite regulatory methods of reaction to cer- 

 tain stimuli. In these cases the animal is not compelled to go through 

 the process of performing varied movements, with subsequent fixation of 

 the successful movement. How are such cases to be accounted for? 



If the regulatory method of reaction acquired through the process 

 sketched in the preceding paragraphs could be inherited, there would of 

 course be no difficulty in accounting for such congenital regulatory re- 

 actions. In Protozoa this is apparently the real state of the case ; there 

 appears to be no reason why the products of reproduction by division 

 should not inherit the properties of the individual that divides, however 

 these properties were attained. But in the Metazoa such inheritance of 

 acquirements presents great theoretical difficulties, and has not been ex- 

 perimentally demonstrated to occur, though it is perhaps too early to con- 

 sider the matter as yet out of court. If such inheritance does not occur, 

 the existence of congenital definite regulatory reactions would seem 

 explicable only on the basis of the natural selection of individuals having 

 varying methods of reaction, unless we are to adopt the theories of vital- 

 ism. In the method we have sketched above, a certain reaction that is 



1 See note, page 317. 



