124 THE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE CONGRESS 



functions and products of the over-individual attitudes are classified. 

 The mathematical object is a free creation, and a creation not only 

 as to the combination of elements that would be the case with 

 many laboratory substances of the chemist too but a creation as to 

 the elements themselves, and the value of that creation, its " mathe- 

 matical interest," is to be judged by ideals of thought; that is, by 

 logical purposes. No doubt this logical purpose is its application in 

 the world of objects and the mathematical concepts must thus fit the 

 objective world so absolutely that mathematics can be conceived as a 

 description of the world after abstracting not only from the will-rela- 

 tions, as physics does, but also from the content. Mathematics would, 

 then, be the phenomenalistic science of the form and order of the 

 world. In this way, mathematics has indeed a claim to places in both 

 divisions: among the physical sciences if we emphasize its applica- 

 bility to the world, and among the teleological sciences if we empha- 

 size the free creation of the objects by the logical will. But if we really 

 go back to epistemological principles, our system has to prefer the 

 latter emphasis; that is, we must coordinate mathematics with logic 

 and not with physics. 



As to the subdivision of philosophy, it is most essential for us to 

 point to the negative fact that of course psychology cannot have a 

 place in the philosophical department, as part of the Normative Divi- 

 sion. There is perhaps no science whose position in the system of 

 knowledge offers so many methodological difficulties as psychology. 

 Historical tradition of course links it with philosophy; throughout a 

 great part of its present endeavors it is, on the other hand, linked with 

 physiology. Thus we find it sometimes coordinated with logic and 

 ethics, and sometimes, especially in the classical positivistic systems, 

 coordinated with the sciences of the organic functions. We have seen 

 why a really logical treatment has to disregard those historical and 

 practical relations and has to separate the psychological sciences from 

 the philosophical and the biological sciences. Yet even this does 

 not complete the list of problems which must be settled, inasmuch 

 as modern thinkers have frequently insisted that psychology itself 

 allows a twofold aspect. We can have a psychology which describes 

 and explains the mental life by analyzing it into its elements and by 

 connecting these elements through causality. But there may be 

 another psychology which treats inner life in that immediate unity in 

 which we experience it and seeks to interpret it as the free function 

 of personality. This latter kind of psychology has been called volun- 

 taristic psychology as against the phenomenalistic psychology which 

 seeks description and explanation. Such voluntaristic psychology 

 would clearly belong again to a different division. It would be a 

 theory of individual life as a function of will, and would thus be 

 introductory to the historical sciences and to the normative sciences 



