190 PHILOSOPHY 



lish, not at all any monism, but a rational pluralism. And this will 

 also reveal to us, I think, that our prevalent construing of the Uncon- 

 ditioned and the Conditioned, the Necessary and the Contingent, the 

 Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute and the Relative, suffers from 

 an equal inaccuracy of analysis, and precisely for this reason gives 

 a plausible but in fact untrustworthy support to the monistic inter- 

 pretation of God, and Soul, and World; or, as Hegel and his chief 

 adherents prefer to name them, God, Mind, and Nature. If the 

 Kantian analysis stands, then it seems to follow, clearly enough, that 

 God is the Inclusive Unit which at once embraces Mind and Nature, 

 Soul and World, expresses itself in them, and imparts to them their 

 meaning; and the plain dictate then is, that Kant's personal pre- 

 judice, and the personal prejudices of others like him, in favor of 

 a transcendent God, must give way to that conception of the Divine, 

 as immanent and inclusive, which is alone consistent with its being 

 indeed the Totality of Conditions, the Necessary Postulate, and 

 the Sufficient Reason, for both Subject and Object. 



But will Kant's analysis stand? Have we not here another of his 

 few but fatal slips, like his doctrine of the dependence of Number 

 upon Time and Space, and its consequent subjection to them? It 

 surely seems so. If the veritable postulate of categorical syllogizing 

 be, as Kant thinks it is, merely the Subject, the self as experiencer of 

 presented phenomena, in contrast to the Object, the causally united 

 sum of possible phenomena; and if the true postulate of conditional 

 syllogizing is this cosmic Object, as contrasted with the correlate 

 Subject, then it would seem we cannot avoid certain pertinent ques- 

 tions. Is such a postulate Subject any fit and adequate account of the 

 whole Self, of the Soul? is there not a vital difference between this 

 subject-self and the Self as Person? does not Kant himself imply 

 so, in his doctrine of the primacy of the Practical Reason? Again: Is 

 not the World, as explained in Kant's analysis, and as afterwards 

 made by him the solution of the Cosmological Antinomies, simply the 

 supplemental factor necessarily correlate to the subjective aspect 

 of the conscious life, and reduced from its uncritical role of thing-in- 

 itself to the intelligible subordination required by Kant's theory of 

 Transcendental Idealism? and can this be any adequate account 

 of the Idea that is to stand in sufficing contrast to the whole Self, 

 the Person? what less than the Society of Persons can meet the 

 World-Idea for that? Further: If with Kant we take the World to 

 mean no more than this object-factor in self-consciousness, must not 

 the Soul, the total Self, from which, according to Kant's Transcen- 

 dental Idealism, both Space and Time issue, supplying the basis for 

 the immutable contrast between the experiencing subject and the 

 really experienced objects, must not this whole Self be the real 

 meaning of the "Totality of Conditions, itself unconditioned," which 



