PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 205 



allowance made for the injury wrought by his divorce of the two 

 philosophies, that of faith and that of science, and his excessive 

 estimate of the value-judgments which repose in the mist of a feeling- 

 faith, added something of worth by way of exposing the barrenness 

 of the Kantian doctrine of an unknowable "Thing-in-itself." 



From men like Fr. Schlegel (1772-1829), whose valid protest against 

 the sharp separation of speculative philosophy from the a3sthetical, 

 social, and ethical life, assumed the "standpoint of irony," little real 

 result in the discovery of truth could be expected. But Schleier- 

 macher (1768-1834), in spite of that mixture of unfused elements 

 which has made his philosophy "a rendezvous for the most diverse 

 systems," contributed valuable factors to the century's philosophical 

 development, both of a negative and of a positive character. This 

 thinker was peculiarly fortunate in the enrichment of the conception 

 of experience as warranting a justifiable confidence in the ontological 

 value of ethical, sesthetical, and religious sentiment and ideas; but he 

 was most unfortunate in reviving and perpetuating the unjustifiable 

 Kantian distinction between cognition and faith in the field of ex- 

 perience. On the whole, therefore, the Faith-philosophy and the 

 Romantic School can easily be said to have contributed more than 

 a negative and modifying influence to the development of the philo- 

 sophy of the nineteenth century. Its more modern revival toward 

 the close of the same century, and its continued hold upon certain 

 minds of the present day, are evidences of the positive but partial 

 truth which its tenets, however vaguely and unsystematically, con- 

 tinue to maintain in an aesthetically and practically attractive way. 



The admirers of Kant strove earnestly and with varied success 

 to remedy the defects of his system. Among the earlier, less cele- 

 brated and yet important members of this group, were K. G. Rein- 

 hold (1758-1823), and Maimon (died, 1800). The former, like 

 Descartes, in that he was educated by the Jesuits, began the attempt, 

 after rejecting some of the arbitrary distinctions of Kant and his 

 barren and self-contradictory "Thing-in-itself," to unify the critical 

 philosophy by reducing it to some one principle. The latter really 

 transcended Kant in his philosophical skepticism, and anticipated the 

 Hamiltonian form of the so-called principle of relativity. Fries (1773- 

 1843), and Hermes (1775-1831) the latter of whom saw in empir- 

 ical psychology the only true propsedeutic to philosophy should be 

 mentioned in this connection. In the same group was another, both 

 mathematician and philosopher, who strove more successfully than 

 others of this group to accept the critical standpoint of Kant and yet 

 to transcend his negative conclusions with regard to a theory of 

 knowledge. I refer to Bolzano (Prague, 1781-1848), who stands in the 

 same line of succession with Fries and Hermes, and whose works 

 on the Science of Religion (4 vols. 1834) and his Science of Know- 



