PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 209 



lectic. Still another group earned for themselves the supposedly 

 opprobrious but decidedly vague title of "Dualists," by rejecting 

 what they conceived to be the pantheism of Hegel. Still others, like 

 Fries and Beneke and their successors, strove to parallel philosophy 

 with the particular sciences by grounding it in an empirical but 

 scientific psychology; and thus they instituted a line of closely con- 

 nected development, to which reference has already been made. 



Hegel himself believed that he had permanently effected that 

 reconciliation of the orthodox creed with the cognition of Ultimate 

 Reality at which his dialectic aimed. In all such attempts at recon- 

 ciliation three great questions are chiefly concerned: (1) the Being of 

 God; (2) the nature of man; (3) the actual and the ideally satisfac- 

 tory relations between the two. But, as might have been expected, 

 a period of wild, irregular, and confused contention met the attempt 

 to establish this claim. In this conflict of more or less noisy and 

 popular as well as of thoughtful and scholastic philosophy, Hegelians 

 of various degrees of fidelity, anti-Hegelians of various degrees of 

 hostility, and ultra-Hegelians of various degrees of eccentricity, all 

 took a valiant and conspicuous part. We cannot follow its history; 

 but we can learn its lesson. Polemical philosophy, as distinguished 

 from quiet, reflective, and critical but constructive philosophy involves 

 a most uneconomical use of mental force. Yet out of this period of 

 conflict, and in a measure as its result, there came a period of improved 

 relations between science and philosophy and between philosophy and 

 theology, which was the dawn, toward the close of the nineteenth 

 century, of that better illumined day into the middle of which we 

 hope that we are proceeding. 



Before leaving this idealistic movement in Germany, and else- 

 where as influenced largely by German philosophy, one other name 

 deserves mention. This name is that of Lotze, who combined ele- 

 ments from many previous thinkers with those derived from his own 

 studies and thoughts, the conceptions of mechanism as applied 

 to physical existences and to psychical life, with the search for some 

 monistic Principle that shall satisfy the sesthetical and ethical, as 

 well as the scientific demands of the human mind. This variety of 

 interests and of culture led to the result of his making important 

 contributions to psychology, logic, metaphysics, and esthetics. If 

 we find his system of thinking as I think we must lacking in 

 certain important elements of consistency and obscured in places by 

 doubts as to his real meaning, this does not prevent us from assign- 

 ing to Lotze a position which, for versatility of interests, genial 

 quality of reflection and criticism, suggestiveness of thought and 

 charm of style, is second to no other in the history of nineteenth 

 century philosophical development. 



In France and in England the first quarter of the last century 



