THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS 251 



is the true point of view from which the meaning of the world is to be 

 sought. 



Having determined the metaphysical point of view, the next ques- 

 tion of vital importance is that of its principle. And we may cut mat- 

 ters short here by saying at once that the principle we are seeking is 

 that of sufficient reason, and we may say that a reason will be suffi- 

 cient when it adequately expresses the world-view or concept under 

 which an investigation is being prosecuted. Let us suppose that this 

 world-view is that of simple mathematics, the principle of sufficient 

 reason here will be that of quantitative equivalence of parts; or, from 

 the standpoint of the whole, that of infinite divisibility. Whereas, if we 

 take the world of the ultra-mathematical science, which is determined 

 by the notion of phenomena depending on underlying ground, we will 

 find that the sufficient reason in this sphere takes the form of adequate 

 cause or condition. The determining condition or causes of any phys- 

 ical phenomenon supply, from that point of view, the ratio sufficiens 

 of its existence. We have seen that the sufficiency of a reason in the 

 above cases has been determined in view of that notion which defines 

 the kind of world the investigation is dealing with. Let us apply this 

 insight to the problem of the principle of metaphysics, and we will 

 soon conclude that no reason can be metaphysically sufficient that 

 does not satisfy the requirements of a world conceived under the 

 notion of inception and realization ; or, more specifically, idea and 

 reality. In short, the reason of metaphysics will refuse to regard its 

 world as a mechanism that is devoid of thought and intention; that 

 lacks, in short, the motives of internal determination and movement, 

 and w r ill in all cases insist that an explanation or interpretation can 

 be metaphysically adequate only when its ultimate reference is to an 

 idea that is in the process of purposive fulfillment. Such an explana- 

 tion we call teleological or rational, rather than merely mechanical, 

 and such a principle is alone adequate to embody the ratio sufficiens 

 of metaphysics. 



Having determined the point of view and principle of meta- 

 physics, the question of metaphysical method will be divested of some 

 of its greatest difficulties. It will be clear to any one who reflects that 

 the very first problem in regard to the method of metaphysics will 

 be that of its starting-point and the kind of results it is to look for. 

 And little can be accomplished here until it has been settled that con- 

 sciousness is to have the primacy, and that its prerogative is to supply 

 both standpoint and principle of the investigation. We have gone 

 a long way toward mastering our method when we have settled these 

 points: (1) that the metaphysical world is a world of consciousness; 



(2) that the conscious form of effort rather than the mechanical is 

 the species of activity or movement with which we have to deal; and, 



(3) that the world it is seeking to interpret is ultimately one of idea 



