280 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 



ical mass. The establishment, therefore, of the laws of the theory 

 of knowledge is not itself a psychological analysis, but a knowledge 

 of self by the logical by virtue of which it extricates itself out of the 

 psychological mass. Theory of knowledge, like every rationalism, 

 includes, it is true, very real presuppositions with regard to the sig- 

 nificant, rational, and teleologically connective character of reality, 

 and without this presupposition it is untenable; in it lies its root. 

 It is insight of former days, the importance of which, however, must 

 constantly be emphasized anew, that discusses the validity of the 

 rational as opposed to the merely empirical. But still more im- 

 portant than this thesis, are several inferences which are given 

 with it. 



The establishment of the laws of consciousness, in which we 

 produce experience, is a selection of the laws out of experience itself, 

 a knowledge of itself by the reason contained in the very experience 

 by way of the analysis which extracts it. It is then an endless task, 

 completed by constantly renewed attacks, and always only approxi- 

 mately solvable. The complete separation of the merely psychological 

 and actual and of the logical and necessary will never be completely 

 accomplished, but will always be open to doubt; one can only, 

 attempt always to limit more vigorously the field of what is doubtful. 

 And with this something further is connected. 



The inexhaustible production of life becomes constantly, in the 

 latent amount of reason, richer than the analysis discerns, or, in 

 other w r ords, the laws which are brought into the light of logic will 

 always be less the amount of reason not brought into consciousness, 

 and conscious logic will always be obliged to correct itself and enrich 

 itself out of the unartificial logical operations arising in contact with 

 the object. So a finished system of a priori principles, but this sys- 

 tem will always be in growth, will be obliged unceasingly to correct 

 itself, and to contain open spaces. 



Finally, and above all, in case of this separation, there remains 

 within the psychologically conditioned appearance, a residuum, 

 which is either not conceived, but is later reduced to law and thereby 

 a conceived phenomenon, or which never can be so, and is therefore 

 illusion and error. If the psychological and the theoretical for know- 

 ledge are to be separated, then that can occur, not merely to show 

 that both must always be together, and form real experience only 

 when together, but there must also be a rejection of that which is 

 merely psychological and not rational since it is illusion and error. 

 The distinction between the apparent and the real was the point 

 of departure which made the whole theory necessary, and, accord- 

 ingly, the merely psychological must remain appearance and error 

 side by side with that which is psychological and, at the same time, 

 theoretical for knowledge. There always remains in consciousness 



