RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES 297 



complained of, as an inevitable, and in some degree a proper result 

 of the imperfect state of those sciences " (that is, of logic, jurispru- 

 dence, and ethics). "It is not to be expected that there should be 

 agreement about the definition of anything, until there is agree- 

 ment about the thing itself." This remarkable disparity of opinion 

 is due partly to the changes in the treatment of logic from Kant to 

 Mill, and partly to the fact that both statements are extreme. That 

 the science of logic was "completed and perfect" in the time of 

 Kant could only with any degree of accuracy be said of the treat- 

 ment of syllogistic proof or the deductive logic of Aristotle. That 

 the diversity was so great as pictured by Mill is not historically 

 exact, but could be said only of the new epistemological and psycho- 

 logical treatment of logic and not of the traditional formal logic. 

 The confusion in logic is no doubt largely due to disagreement in 

 the delimitation of its proper territory and to the consequent variety 

 of opinions as to its relations to other disciplines. The rise of induct- 

 ive logic, coincident with the rise and growth of physical science 

 and empiricism, forced the consideration of the question as to the 

 relation of formal thought to reality, and the consequent entangle- 

 ment of logic in a triple alliance of logic, psychology, and meta- 

 physics. How logic can maintain friendly relations with both of 

 these and yet avoid endangering its territorial integrity has not been 

 made clear by logicians or psychologists or metaphysicians, and 

 that, too, in spite of persistent attempts justly to settle the issue as 

 to their respective spheres of influence. Until modern logic definitely 

 settles the question of its aims and legitimate problems, it is difficult 

 to see how any agreement can be reached as to its relation to the 

 other disciplines. The situation as it confronts one in the discus- 

 sion of the relations of logic to allied subjects may be analyzed as 

 follows : 



1. The relation of logic as science to logic as art. 



2. The relation of logic to psychology. 



3. The relation of logic to metaphysics. 



The development of nineteenth century logic has made an answer to 

 the last two of the foregoing problems exceedingly difficult. Indeed, 

 one may say that the evolution of modern epistemology has had a 

 centrifugal influence on logic, and instead of growth towards unity 

 of conception we have a chaos of diverse and discordant theories. 

 The apple of discord has been the theory of knowledge. A score of 

 years ago when Adamson wrote his admirable article in the Ency- 

 clopedia Britannica (article "Logic," 1882), he found the conditions 

 much the same as I now find them. " Looking to the chaotic state of 

 logical text-books at the present time, one would be inclined to say 

 that there does not exist anywhere a recognized currently received 

 body of speculations to which the title logic can be unambiguously 



