300 LOGIC 



A judgment is true when the thought (whose inward process is the 

 judgment and the expression in vocal symbols is the proposition) 

 regards as conjoined or divided that which is conjoined or divided 

 in actuality; in other words, when the thought is congruous with 

 the real. While Aristotle does not ignore induction as a scientific 

 method, (how could he when he regards the self-subsistent individual 

 as the only real?) yet he says that, as a method, it labors under 

 the defect of being only proximate; a complete induction from all 

 particulars is not possible, and therefore cannot furnish demonstra- 

 tion. Only the deductive process proceeding syllogistically from 

 the universal (or essential truth) to the particular is scientifically 

 cogent or apodictic. Consequently Aristotle developed the science 

 of logic mainly as a syllogistic technique or instrument of demon- 

 stration. From this brief sketch of Aristotle's logical views it will 

 be seen that the epistemological and metaphysical relations of 

 logic which involve its greatest difficulty and cause the greatest 

 diversity in its modern exponents, were present in undeveloped 

 form to the mind of the first logician. It would require a mighty 

 optimism to suppose that this difficulty and diversity, which has 

 increased rather than diminished in the progress of historical philo- 

 sophy, should suddenly be made to vanish by some magic of re- 

 statement of subject-matter, or theoretical delimitation of the 

 discipline. As Fichtfe said of philosophy, " The sort of a philosophy 

 that a man has, depends on the kind of man he is;" so one might 

 almost say of logic, "The sort of logic that a man has, depends on 

 the kind of philosopher he is." If the blight of discord is ever re- 

 moved from epistemology, we may expect agreement as to the rela- 

 tions of logic to metaphysics. Meanwhile logic has the great body 

 of scientific results deposited in the physical sciences on which to 

 build and test, with some assurance, its doctrine of methodology; 

 and as philosophy moves forward persistently to the final solution 

 of its problems, logic may justly expect to be a beneficiary in its 

 established theories. 



After Aristotle's death logic lapsed into a formalism more and 

 more removed from any vital connection with reality and oblivious 

 to the profound epistemological and methodological questions that 

 Aristotle had at least raised. In the Middle Ages it became a highly 

 developed exercise in inference applied to the traditional dogmas of 

 theology and science as premises, with mainly apologetic or polemi- 

 cal functions. Its chief importance is found in its application to the 

 problem of realism and nominalism, the question as to the nature of 

 universals. At the height of scholasticism realism gained its victory 

 by syllogistically showing the congruity of its premises with certain 

 fundamental dogmas of the Church, especially with the dogma of the 

 unity and reality of the Godhead. The heretical conclusion involved 



