CONTENT AND VALIDITY OF THE CAUSAL LAW 361 



The presupposition of the possibility of the causal relations in- 

 cludes, therefore, more than mere perceptive elements. It involves 

 the relation of different, if you will, of peculiar contents of percep- 

 tion, by virtue of which we recognize a., >6 2 . . . a n b n as events 

 that resemble one another and the event a t > 6j qualitatively as well 

 as in their sequence. There are accordingly involved in our presup- 

 position reproductive elements which indicate the action of memory. 

 In order that I may in the act of perceiving a 3 > 6 3 apprehend the 

 uniformity of this present content with that of a 2 > 6 2 and o 1 > 6j , 

 these earlier perceptions must in some way, perhaps through mem- 

 ory, 1 be revived with the present perception. 



In this reproduction there is still a further element, which can 

 be separated, to be sure only in abstracto, from the one just pointed 

 out. The present revived content, even if it is given in memory as 

 an independent mental state, is essentially different from the original 

 perception. It differs in all the modifications in which the memory 

 of lightning and thunder could differ from the perception of their 

 successive occurrence, or, again, the memory of a pain and the re- 

 sulting disturbance of attention could differ from the corresponding 

 original experience. However, as memory, the revived experience 

 presents itself as a picture of that which has been previously per- 

 ceived. Especially is this the case in memory properly so called, 

 where the peculiar space and time relations individualize the revived 

 experience. If we give to this identifying element in the associative 

 process a logical expression, we shall have to say that there is in- 

 volved in revival, and especially in memory, an awareness that the 

 present ideas recall the same content that was previously given us 

 in perception. To be sure, the revival of the content of previous 

 perceptions does not have to produce ideas, let alone memories. 

 Rapid, transitory, or habitual revivals, stimulated by associative 

 processes, can remain unconscious, that is, they need not appear as 

 ideas or states of consciousness. Stimulation takes place, but con- 

 sciousness does not arise, provided we mean by the term " conscious- 

 ness " the genus of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions. None the 

 less it must not be forgotten that this awareness of the essential 

 identity of the present revived content with that of the previous 

 perception can be brought about in every such case of reproduction. 

 How all this takes place is not our present problem. 



We can apply to this second element in the reproductive process, 

 which we have found to be essential to the causal relation, a Kantian 



1 It is not our present concern to ascertain how this actually happens. The 

 psychological presuppositions of the present paper are contained in the theory of 

 reproduction that I have worked out in connection with the psychology of speech 

 in the articles on "Die psychologischen Grundlagen der Reziehungen zwischen 

 Sprechen und Denken," Archiv fur systematische Philosophic, II, in, und vn; 

 cf. note 1, page 151. 



