Phenomena of Memory. 169 



mises, for these, so far, both as regards form and force r 

 point only to multiety in unity and unity in multiety: 

 Life in all its aspects, mental and others, according to 

 this view, is more than a mere bodily function, for its 

 only foundation is in the wSe'a which underlies the 

 ei'SwXoi/, or rather in the IBea of the Divine Being which 

 is the substance of all IBeai. Death attacks the etSto\o/-, 

 resolving the partial into the general, the transient into 

 the permanent, transforming it into the !8ea perhaps, but 

 it does not reach the i'8ea, which, by virtue of its Divine 

 original, remains imperishable, immortal. Nor does 

 death result in disembodiment, for, instead of being 

 mere formless energy, the spiritual form of the ei'SeuXov 

 always remains in the ISea a form which may or may 

 not be revealed to the senses. Indeed, Plato would 

 have no difficulty in believing that the gods might 

 appear among men, and again disappear, and that man, 

 without any miracle, might undergo corresponding 

 changes, because he believed in the material world as 

 something which was capable of being idealized or 

 spiritualized so as to be rapt away from the senses, and 

 in the ideal and spiritual world as something not insus- 

 ceptible of that transformation by which it could be 

 brought within the reach of the senses. 



Aristotle and Plato, in fact, represent two irrecon- 

 cilable schools of thought. That which is divine, TO 

 delov, is to Aristotle no more than an impersonal First 

 Cause, or energy, which is really extra-mundane rather 

 than intra-mundane, and which works only in creation. 

 That which is divine to Plato is a personal God, 6 0eo?, 

 who may or may not be revealed to the senses, who is 

 all in all in a system of nature in which a law of unity 

 in multiety and multiety in unity is the law of laws, and 

 who is the upholder as well as the creator of all things. 



