1 80 Traces of Unity in the 



of present existence nothing to be remembered : for 

 every time that any unnoticed object or subject cameunder 

 notice again it must appear as another object or subject. 

 Without this power, for example, the days and years of 

 my own personal life must be broken up into disconruscted 

 moments, for there would be no means of bridging over 

 the intervals of forgetfulness which recur every moment. 

 Nay, there must be a continual confounding of my own 

 identity with that of other persons and things whenever 

 my thoughts roamed away from myself. If the power 

 of identifying were destroyed it could not be otherwise. 

 What then? How is it that I know that I myself am at 

 all times I myself, and not another person or thing about 

 whose reality I am equally convinced ? Is it enough to 

 suppose that this knowledge is conveyed through the 

 senses to the sensorium, and there stored up for the use 

 of the memory ? The senses have much to do in the 

 matter too much perhaps : but they cannot do all that 

 has to be done. The sensorium has much to do, but 

 less in all probability than is commonly supposed. The 

 senses have much to do in the primary acquisition of 

 many facts and fancies, but when this knowledge is once 

 acquired the memory would seem to have little or no 

 occasion for their service. And, without question, the 

 help of the senses is not more necessary in respect of 

 memories which are beyond the reach of the senses, for 

 in this case the senses can have nothing to do even with 

 the primary acquisition of that which is remembered. 

 Be this as it may, however, there is more in the remem- 

 brance of another person or thing than can be accounted 

 for by cerebration or any reaction between the sensorium 

 and senses, and this is the conviction of the identity of 

 that person or thing. For how is this conviction to be ac- 

 quired except by assuming an actual transaction between 



