Phenomena of Memory, \ 8 1 



the person remembering and the person or thing remem- 

 bered a transaction which seems to imply a continuance 

 of the interaction by which the memory took cognizance of 

 the person or thing remembered in the first instance, or 

 else a transference, so to speak, of the mind of him who 

 remembers so as to allow a comparison of the copy in 

 the brain with the person or thing copied. It cannot 

 be enough to look at the copy : and, if it be necessary 

 to compare the copy with that which is copied, then it 

 seems to be necessary to believe that the power of 

 identifying another person or thing implies a wider 

 mental presence than that which is limited to body, a 

 presence which is transcorporeal as well as corporeal, 

 a presence which is in a measure superior to place, 

 a presence which is altogether inconsistent with the 

 notion that memory is no more than a mere function of 

 certain brain - cells. The case, indeed, is one for a 

 Platonist to deal with rather than for an Aristotelian. 

 For a Platonist the senses and the sensorium alike must 

 be impediments rather than helps in the acquisition of 

 the ideas which underlie the things of sense, and which 

 are the only realities. For him, instead of disconnexion, 

 there must be universal unity in diversity and diversity 

 in unity, with the Divine Being as the living centre of 

 all things. For him, by reason of this all-pervading 

 unity, all these ideas must be so far spiritual as to be 

 superior to place. For him, memory must point to 

 mind as something which is not to be confined within 

 any corporeal limits as something which is quite as 

 much transcorporeal as corporeal. For him, the seat of 

 memory will be, not in the sensorium exclusively, nor 

 yet in the sensorium together with the senses, but any- 

 where and everywhere, wherever the mind has chanced 

 to roam : and the act of remembering will take place 



