Imagination, Will, and Intelligence. 189 



into the more it becomes evident that the will requires 

 a wider field for action than that which is to be found in 

 cerebration, or any other mode of bodily action, as wide 

 even as that required for the manifestation of the imagi- 

 nation and the memory. 



In his Sylva Sylvarum (Century X., 945,946), Bacon 

 has said something which is much to the point hero. 

 " The problem," so runs the text, " is whether a man 

 constantly and strongly beleaving that such a thing shall 

 be (as that such an one will love him, or that such an 

 one-will grant him his request, or that such an one shall 

 recover a sicknesse, or the like) it doth help anything to 

 the effecting of the thing itselfe. And here againe we 

 must warily distinguish, for it is not meant (as hath been 

 partly said before) that it should help by making a man 

 more stout, or more industrious (in which kind a con- 

 stant beleafe doth much), but mearely by a secret opera- 

 tion, or binding, or changing the spirit of another. And 

 in this it is hard (as we began to say) to make any new 

 experiments, for I cannot command myselfe to beleave 

 what I will, and so no triall can be made. Nay, it is 

 worse, for whatsoever a man imagineth doubtingly, or 

 with feare, must needs do hurt, if imagination have any 

 power at all. For a man representeth that pftener that 

 hee feareth, than the contrarie. 



" The helpe therefore is, for a man to work by an- 

 other, in whom he may create beleafe, and not by him- 

 selfe, untill himselfe have found by experience that 

 imagination doth prevaile, for then experience worketh 

 in himselfe beleafe, if the beleafe that such a thing shall 

 be, be joyned with a beleafe that his imagination may 

 proceede it. 



" For example, I related one time to a man that was 

 curious and vaine enough in these things, that I saw a 



