THE WONDERS OF LIFE 



In a narrower sense reason is regarded as the proper 

 function of mind, and as the essential prerogative of man 

 in the animal world. In this sense Kant especially has 

 done much to strengthen the prevailing conception of 

 mental action, and has, by his Critique of Pure Reason, 

 converted philosophy into a mere "science of reason." 

 In consequence of this conception, which still prevails 

 widely in scientific circles, we will first study the mental 

 life in the action of reason, and try to form a clear idea 

 of this great wonder of life. 



Psychologists and metaphysicians are of very varied 

 opinions as to the difference between intelligence and 

 reason. Schopenhauer, for instance, considers causality 

 to be the sole function of intelligence, and the formation 

 of concepts to be the province of reason; in his opinion 

 the latter power alone marks off man from the brute. 

 However, the power of abstraction, which collects the 

 common features in a number of different presentations, 

 is also found in the higher animals. Intelligent dogs not 

 only discriminate between individual men, cats, etc., 

 according as they are sympathetic or the reverse, but 

 they have a general idea of man or cat, and behave very 

 differently towards the two. On the other hand, the 

 power of forming concepts is still so slight in uncivilized 

 races that it rises but little above the mind of dogs, 

 horses, etc.; the mental interval between them and 

 civilized man is extremely wide. However, a long scale 

 of reason unites the various stages of association of 

 presentations which lead up to the formation of concepts; 

 it is quite impossible to lay down a strict line of demarca- 

 tion between the lower and higher mental functions of 

 animals, or between the latter and reason. Hence the 

 distinction between the two cerebral functions is only 

 relative; the intelligence comprises the narrower circle 

 of concrete and more proximate associations, while rea- 

 son deals with the wider sphere of abstract and more 



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